News

Tuesday 4 February 2003

Wednesday 6 November afternoon government press briefing

Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq, Science and Tuition Fees.

Iraq

The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister had had a fifteen minute telephone conversation with President Bush this afternoon. Asked for further detail, the PMOS said that they had agreed that the draft Resolution was a very good text and that it was the fruit of a lot of hard work. It gave us what we wanted in terms of a tough new mandate for Hans Blix and the IAEA and we hoped it would be passed quickly.

Following the Prime Minister’s announcement at PMQs today, the PMOS confirmed that a new UN Resolution had just been tabled at the P5 in New York. After their discussion, it would then be passed to the other ten members of the Security Council for consideration. Once that had happened, there would be a vote and we hoped that an agreement could be reached fairly quickly.

The PMOS went through some of the main points of the text of the draft Resolution. It made clear that Iraq was in material breach of its UN obligations and that this was "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council" through the establishment of an "enhanced inspection regime". It had always been our aim to achieve a Resolution which provided for a new tough and intrusive inspection regime, and that was precisely what this draft did.

The Resolution required Iraq to "provide to UNMOVIC, IAEA and the Security Council, not later than thirty days from the date of this Resolution, a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and other delivery systems".

The text also stated that "Iraq should provide UNMOVIC and IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of (their) choice……(They) may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government". The draft Resolution also underlined that UNMOVIC and the IAEA should have "unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that of other sites".

The text requested the Secretary General "immediately to notify Iraq of this Resolution, which is binding on Iraq (and) demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this Resolution".

The draft Resolution "directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations". It also "decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council Resolutions".

Asked whether the final paragraph he had read out was an indication that this was a two-Resolution solution, the PMOS said it made clear that there would be a further discussion at the Security Council should a breach be reported and it would be up to the Security Council to assess the situation and decide what should follow. The Prime Minister had been fairly clear, he thought, in the House.

The PMOS briefed journalists on the timelines to this process. Saddam Hussein had seven days to confirm his intention to comply. Thirty days after the agreement of the Resolution, he had to declare all aspects of his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programmes. Within forty-five days of the agreement of the Resolution, Hans Blix and his team must be back in Iraq. Sixty days after that, they would update the Council on their findings.

The PMOS said that the Security Council would discuss this draft text and at some point there would be a vote. At this stage, it was difficult to say exactly when that might be. However, once the text had been tabled, it was usually the case that a vote and, he hoped, an agreement would be reached relatively quickly. The members of the Security Council comprised the P5 plus Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Syria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, New Guinea and Ireland.

Many people had said at the outset of this process in September that we would not be able to achieve another Resolution. We were not there yet. As the Prime Minister had said in the House today, a huge amount of work had been done by Jack Straw, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and the Foreign Office to get to this point. Every effort would now be made to try to make this work. Ultimately, however, that could only happen with the full co-operation of Saddam Hussein. As we had pointed out many times in the past, the choice of how he was disarmed was in the end up to Saddam himself.

Asked whether the Resolution would allow us to bomb Iraq within a period of seven days if Saddam failed to comply with his obligations, the PMOS said that we hadn’t reached the point of military action. As we had underlined consistently, military action was neither imminent nor inevitable. All our effort was going into trying to make this new Resolution work. Once it had been agreed - which we hoped would happen fairly quickly - it would obviously be for Saddam Hussein to respond to it. The ball would then be in his court.

Asked whether the Resolution, as it was, could be used to launch military action against Iraq without having to go back to the Security Council for a second Resolution and whether it provided a legal base, the PMOS said that we would act in accordance with international law. We were focussing on ensuring that the UN Weapons Inspectors were able to return to Iraq to do their job properly unimpeded, with access to all areas, through a fresh Security Council mandate. Once the Resolution had been agreed by the UN, it would be for Saddam Hussein to respond to it. As the Prime Minister had said in the House this afternoon, we hoped that Saddam would co-operate. If he didn’t, then he had to understand that action would follow. He encouraged journalists to go one story and one step at a time.

Asked if he would agree that the UK and US had compromised hugely on the new Resolution, the PMOS said no. The text gave us everything we had wanted from the start. Put to him that the Americans had indicated that this Resolution did not contain all the measures they - and we - had wanted, the PMOS said he would disagree absolutely with the suggestion. He underlined that we were entirely satisfied with this Resolution. It gave the Weapons Inspectors a clear, new mandate to return to Iraq. It "recalls…..that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations". He repeated that we believed that the draft gave us everything we wanted. Challenged that it did not in light of the fact that the Security Council would have to be consulted again if Saddam failed to comply, the PMOS said that the Resolution had charged Hans Blix with the responsibility of reporting any breaches by Saddam to the Security Council, who, in turn, had given an undertaking that they would discuss the matter seriously. However, we were not at that point yet. Should we get there, then we could discuss what should happen next. We had always made clear that the UN route was the right route to tackle the threat posed by Saddam’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, it had to be a way to deal with it, not avoid dealing with it. The Prime Minister believed that this was a very strong draft Resolution. It gave a fresh, new mandate to the Weapons Inspectors. It also made it absolutely clear to Saddam Hussein what he had to do and by when he had to do it.

Asked if today’s developments at the UN demonstrated that the French were ‘now on board’, the PMOS pointed out that the fact that the text was being tabled in the P5 was a fair indication that the detailed discussions which had been going on had been fruitful. It was not for him to speak on behalf of other countries. However, we were confident that where we were now was better than where we were before. That said, we had yet to have a vote.

Questioned further about the prospect of military action, the PMOS pointed out that the Iraqis had only moved thus far because of the credible threat of force. Saddam Hussein had to understand that disarmament was not negotiable. How it happened was ultimately his choice, not ours. All the effort that we had put in to reaching this point was not for nothing. We had done it because we wanted the new inspections regime to work. What the future held was more in Saddam’s hands than in ours.

Asked if the Resolution’s ‘twin-track’ approach - the warning that Iraq faced "serious consequences" if it did not comply with its obligations, and the statement that the Security Council would convene to discuss any breaches reported by Hans Blix - was a deliberate strategy to ensure that all the members of the P5 could say that they had been able to get what they wanted out of it, the PMOS said that as the Resolution made clear, it was important for the Security Council to meet to consider the situation if it was reported that Saddam was in breach of his obligations. The text clearly indicated the UN’s determination to deal with this issue. If Saddam thwarted the will of the international community, it recalled what previous Resolutions had stated - that Iraq would face "serious consequences". The words of the draft spoke for themselves. We hoped Saddam would understand exactly what was required of him once he saw it, should it be passed. Pressed as to whether the Security Council would reconvene if military action were to be taken against Saddam following a breach, the PMOS said that according to the Resolution, the Security Council would "convene immediately upon receipt of a report…..in order to consider the situation". That was pretty clear.

Asked whether the Security Council would convene to discuss the situation if Saddam Hussein refused to confirm his intention to comply with the terms of the new Resolution within seven days of it being agreed, the PMOS pointed out that the Iraqis had already said in previous conversations with Kofi Annan that they would comply. Let us wait and see what happened. Asked when the Resolution might be voted on, the PMOS said it would not be helpful to start imposing timescales. That said, he thought it would happen quite quickly. Asked if might be today, the PMOS said he thought it unlikely. However, we were talking only a matter of days.

Put to him that the timetable set out in the Resolution took us to March 2003 which was ‘dangerously close’ to the end of the fighting period in the Gulf, the PMOS said that the timetable was the timetable. We had said from the outset that military action was not inevitable. Disarmament was. We had done - and would continue to do all we could - to make this Resolution work. He was not going to get into military options, but Saddam had to understand that we were serious. This was all about eliminating the threat arising from his chemical and biological weapons. We could talk about what might happen after March should we have to.

Asked whether the Resolution would help to introduce an element of instability inside Iraq itself, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had pointed out on numerous occasions, the world - and Iraq - would be better off without Saddam Hussein. However, regime change was not the aim of this Resolution. It was all about disarmament. Questioned further, the PMOS said that, as had been made clear, we were absolutely serious about disarmament. It would not help to pre-empt what might happen further down the track. A lot of people had said that we would never reach the point we had reached today. Well we had. Once the Resolution had been agreed, which we hoped it would be quickly, the ball would be in Saddam’s court.

Asked again what action would follow if Saddam Hussein refused to confirm his intention to comply with the terms of the new Resolution within seven days of it being agreed, the PMOS pointed again to paragraphs 4 and 11 in the draft text of the Resolution. Paragraph 4 stated that "…false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this Resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of, this Resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council". Paragraph 11 "Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this Resolution".

Asked whether a Statement would be made in the House about the new Resolution, the PMOS said that consideration was being given to the possibility of a Statement tomorrow by the Foreign Secretary. However, given the House prorogued tomorrow and there was a lot of business which had yet to be completed, it was difficult to confirm anything at this point.

Science

The PMOS said that the Prime Minister would be hosting a meeting in Downing Street tomorrow as part of his ongoing dialogue with the science community. The meeting would be led by David King and the Prime Minister would be briefed by four scientists, all from Cambridge, on the latest developments in nano-science and life sciences. Science was a subject in which the Prime Minister was very interested, as he had demonstrated most recently in his speech last May.

Tuition Fees

Asked whether the Prime Minister had been hinting to the Opposition Leader at PMQs this afternoon that he was thinking again about top-up fees, the PMOS said the Prime Minister was clear that there were real issues which had to be addressed in terms of university funding if we were to protect our research base and our teaching base. A review on this matter was due to report in January and people would have to wait for its conclusions. As the Prime Minister had said, it was important for people to recognise that there was a manifesto commitment on this issue.

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