News

Wednesday 5 February 2003

Tuesday 12 November afternoon government press briefing

Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Spokesman on: Royal Family, Fire Dispute and Iraq.

Royal Family

Asked what involvement the Prime Minister had had in the setting up of the independent inquiry into recent events surrounding the employees of the Palace, the PMOS said that as we had stated from the outset, these were matters for the Palace. If there was such an inquiry and if the Prime Minister had been informed, it would have been as a matter of courtesy.

Asked if he believed that the recent events had taken the gloss off the Jubilee year, the PMOS said that he was not going to be a commentator on allegations that might be swimming around. As he had said this morning, the Prime Minster had said all he had to say about the Burrell case at his news conference last Monday.

Asked the last time the Prime Minister had spoken to the Prince of Wales, the PMOS said he was not aware they had spoken recently. Questioned further about contacts with the Palace, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had had an Audience with the Queen last week. Asked whether this was one of those ’special scenarios’ where Downing Street lent its assistance to the Palace, such as at the time of the death of Princess Diana, the PMOS said that each situation was different. Asked if there was a broader role for the NAO to look into the Royal finances, the PMOS said he was not aware that this was being considered.

Fire Dispute

Asked about the now apparently inevitable fire strike, the PMOS underlined the Prime Minister’s strong belief that the strike was unjustified, dangerous and wrong. Asked whether there was going to be further high level Government contact with the FBU, the PMOS said that as soon as it had been confirmed today that the strike was going ahead, the Deputy Prime Minister had written to the leader of the FBU, Andy Gilchrist, to ask for a meeting to talk about safety issues. They would not discuss pay. He would ask Mr Gilchrist whether the FBU planned to abide by the 1979 TUC Code of Conduct and what emergency cover they planned to provide, especially given the current security climate. In terms of the steps the Government was taking, it was worth pointing out that a huge amount of contingency planning had been ongoing in recent weeks. That would now come into effect. COBRA (Cabinet Office Briefing Room A) would be meeting tomorrow at around lunchtime to go over the final preparations. It would then be operational around the clock once the strike started, and would act as a reporting centre. 999 calls would go through to a central military control centre where they would have access to senior fire officers who would provide advice on appropriate action to take and then direct Green Goddesses and specialist teams accordingly. He pointed out that there were 19,000 members of the armed forces on standby, nearly 400 specialist teams who would operate specialist breathing and/or specialist cutting equipment and 827 Green Goddesses. Asked whether the Prime Minister would be attending COBRA, the PMOS said no, since he would be in Parliament listening for the Queen’s Speech.

Asked if the FBU had agreed to take part in emergency procedures during their strike action and if the Government had asked them to provide such information as part of their contingency planning, the PMOS pointed out that the reason we were contacting Mr Gilchrist was because there had been no clarity on this issue. Put to him that the question had been asked weeks ago, the PMOS said that talks had followed which had then broken down. We now needed some definite answers. In the meantime, the Government had been putting in place its own contingency arrangements because we had a responsibility to ensure public safety as best we could. However, no one should be under any illusion that the service which would be provided by the armed forces would, by definition be second best to the normal fire service, although they would no doubt do a superb job.

In answer to questions, the PMOS said that it was important to put the strike into context. As John Reid had pointed out at this morning’s briefing, it was extraordinary that the FBU should reject out of hand a pay offer of 11.3% over two years which was significantly above the rate of inflation and linked to modernisation at a time when we had a benign inflation environment, and when other public sector workers were looking to settle for less. The PMOS said that the FBU had refused from the start to engage with the Bain Review and address the issues that it had raised for a modern and flexible fire service. Some of the reforms recommended by the Review were perfectly sensible and reasonable. Reforms such as jointly-run control rooms with other emergency services, allowing full and part time fire fighters to crew the same engines, lifting the ban on pre-planned overtime, and the use of defibrillators by fire-fighters to save lives all needed to be looked at. It did not seem to be unreasonable to ask the FBU to sit down and consider these matters when we had a structure and working patterns that had remained more or less unchanged since 1979. Everyone would agree that most jobs and working practices had moved on a bit since then. Why should the FBU be the only public service to be immune from change?

Asked why getting the FBU to clarify what service they would provide appeared to have been forgotten by the contingency planners while talks about pay had continued, the PMOS explained that it was for the FBU to indicate what level of cover they would provide over the next two days. Our emergency cover would do what it could to provide a back up service. Obviously we didn’t know whether the FBU would provide a service complementary to that. If we did, we wouldn’t be writing to Mr Gilchrist to ask for a meeting. There had been talks about this. Now they had called a strike, we needed answers.

Asked why the Government had refused to back a 16% pay rise that had been floated by the employers if safety was such a priority, the PMOS said that Nick Raynsford had, on many occasions in his many interviews, knocked down this suggestion. Everyone would agree that a pay demand of 40% was not in the real world. No Government could accept it because of the impact it would have on inflation, interest rates and the economy, as well as other pay claims. When it had become clear that the employers and the FBU were not making progress in their talks, we had set up the Bain Review - an independent review - to look at the issues of modernisation, and extra pay. Professor Bain had come up with a figure of 11% over two years - twice the level of inflation this year, and probably three times the level next year. The FBU had dismissed working with Professor Bain out of hand - and for them to call 11% ‘an insult’ would strike other public sector workers as pretty bizarre. Asked again if there was anything further the Government could do between now and tomorrow night to stop the strike going ahead, the PMOS said that we had been as reasonable as possible throughout the whole process. We had tried to facilitate dialogue. Usually, disputes such as this concluded with the promise of a review. In this case, we had already set up an independent review which had now been working for nine weeks. However, the FBU had refused to engage in it. Why that should be the case was for the FBU themselves to explain. He pointed out that there were around 40 applicants for every post in the fire service. He would wager that that was way ahead of any other public service by some considerable distance. It was clearly not an indication of a service in which working conditions or pay were that grim.

Asked the Government’s understanding of the 1979 TUC Code of Conduct, the PMOS said that since it was the TUC’s Code of Conduct, it was not a question of what our understanding of it was. The Code talked about providing emergency cover when safety was put at risk in the event of a strike. He pointed out that during the ambulance strikes of 1988, the Ambulance Service had provided a blue light service. It was a statement of fact that if the fire service went on strike, lives would be put at risk. Asked if the Prime Minister believed that the FBU should accept responsibility for deaths resulting from their strike action, the PMOS said that that was a question for the FBU to answer. Our job was to provide emergency cover as best we could, although we had always acknowledged quite openly that it would be second best.

Asked if we would be prepared to ask troops to cross picket lines to use the equipment in fire stations, the PMOS said that this was a question of planning and logistics but that all options remained under review. It was not simply a case of getting into a fire engine and driving away. Put to him that training would only take a few days, the PMOS said that if the military had been trained on the red fire engines, we would have had to pull them out of service, thereby diluting the fire service at a time when there wasn’t even a strike. The judgement at the moment, in discussion with the military, was that our existing plans were the best in the circumstances.

Asked to confirm that our commitment to protect public safety and the safety of the realm was going to be maintained throughout the strike, the PMOS said that as a result of tomorrow’s strike, the level of fire cover provided to the country would not be as good as it usually was. We had acknowledged that that would have an impact on safety. The idea that we had wanted this strike to go ahead was complete and utter nonsense, particularly in the current security climate. This strike was the last thing we wanted. However, it was going ahead and that was what we had to deal with.

Asked again about the Prime Minister’s reported ‘Scargillite’ comment, the PMOS said he had no intention of trying to guess people’s motives. The Prime Minister remained firmly of the view that the strike was wrong, unjustified, unnecessary and potentially very damaging. There was no doubt that it put safety at risk. It was clear that we had bent over backwards to be as reasonable as we could. We did not believe that simply ignoring an independent review, refusing to engage in it and discounting any

recommendations it made was the right way to move forward. We didn’t think the public thought so either.

Asked for further detail about COBRA, the PMOS said that as he understood it, the MOD was planning a full briefing tomorrow. COBRA would essentially act as an information gathering centre to assess how the contingency plans were working and to provide whatever support it could. It was not, however, the operational nerve centre. That would be run by the military. Asked whether Ministers would be involved in COBRA 24-hours a day throughout the strike, the PMOS said that Ministerial meetings would be held every day and they would of course remain in close contact with what was going on there.

Iraq

Asked whether the Government was concerned at the Iraqi Parliament’s decision to reject the United Nations Security Council Resolution, the PMOS said that as he had said this morning, what had happened in Iraq did not change the situation. The demands of the international community remained exactly the same today as they were on Friday. Saddam Hussein knew precisely what he had to do, when he had to do it by and what would happen if he didn’t do it. Questioned further, the PMOS said that, to be frank, we hadn’t spent much time today tuning into the Iraqi Parliamentary channel to find out what had been going on.

Newsletter

Around the Web

Flickr Logo Flickr RSS Feed

History and Tour