Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Spokesman on: London Underground and Fire Dispute.
London Underground
Asked about progress on talks between London Underground management and Union Health and Safety representatives, the PMOS advised journalists that he understood that those discussions were still ongoing. They had not, so it appears, resulted in any change to the situation. He made clear that the PM believed it was totally unacceptable that lines should be closed. Lines should be open, they were not, and that was causing immense disruption to passengers. The Health and Safety Guidance which went out in October specifically about the impact on the transport infrastructure caused by a fire strike, made clear that a strike "would have an extremely small effect on the risk to staff and passengers from fires at stations in tunnels or on trains." They were the competent authority who were able to make these judgements. They endorsed the fact that London Underground had closed deep level underground stations. It was for the London Underground management to talk to the unions and for the management to decide what action needed to be taken.
Asked whether he thought station closures constituted "secondary action" he said that as he understood it, unless a Union made a formal declaration of strike action, it could not be legally defined as secondary action. But he was not an expert on trade union law. Asked whether London Underground Management were simply impotent or whether there was anything they could do, the PMOS said it was for London Underground management to look at the situation and see whether this merited disciplinary action, but he made clear that we did not manage the tube. The PMOS said the Government did not think what was happening should be happening and did not condone it in any way, shape or form.
When asked whether he thought such action might spread to the railway, the PMOS said that he had not heard any suggestions that this was the case, and there was no reason for this to happen. He reminded journalists that the issue here was what the Health and Safety Executive said and their guidelines were clear. Journalists and workers could look them up if they wanted to. He pointed out to journalists that Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate "considers that the risks arising from the withdrawal of fire brigade cover would be adequately controlled by the industry without major effects to services, particularly as emergency train and station evacuation should not be depend on fire brigade intervention." That was set out in the Health and Safety Executive Guidance.
Asked who would take out an injunction against secondary action were there to be one - the Government, or Management, he said he did not know. He made clear that it was for the London Underground Management to sit down with the Unions in this instance and decide what measures they needed to take to ensure the tube ran. Put to him that this could be achieved by staff going back to work, the PMOS agreed wholeheartedly. He believed that London Underground Management should take whatever action they deemed necessary, but given that they are talking at the moment he didn’t think it was for him to get into the minutiae of discussions.
When asked whether we would urge London Underground to take firm action, he again reminded journalists that government did not run the underground but that passengers did have a right to have a service where the trains were running.
Fire Dispute
When asked whether red fire engines would now be used, or whether there was political squeamishness, the PMOS pointed out that all our energies prior to this strike happening had been geared to: a) putting in place contingency planning which had been going on since August, and b) to prevent it happening at all and encouraging people to talk. That had been partially successful and meant we had had ten strike free days that were going to be strike days. But it had not stopped the strike from happening. In terms of contingency planning, we had had to take judgements along the way. The operational decisions that had been taken, with advice from the military and others, was that the best way to do this was through the 19,000 troops, who were a finite resource, training on the Green Goddesses. Those troops were actively deployed. As the Deputy Prime Minister had said, if we moved to a series of eight day strikes then we are not ruling anything out. We were mindful always of the need that public safety is paramount. The PMOS rejected the thesis that it was political squeamishness. As the Prime Minister had said in the House, we had to make a judgement about taking hold of red engines already in use and whether that would precipitate the very strike we were trying to avoid. We now had a strike so were in shifting territory, or potentially would be if we had an eight day strike. Nothing was off the table. We would have to see once this 48 hour strike was over whether and how we had to adjust our plans accordingly.
Asked about the "400 reserve fire-engines" mentioned by David Davies and why these could not be used for training, the PMOS made clear that there were different estimates of how many there were. As the Deputy Prime Minister said in the House, there were around 100 operational. He pointed out to journalists that we were not taking about a warehouse full of reserve fire-engines sitting around waiting for people to drive away. The majority, which were spread around the country, were used to provide backup for fire-engines that had broken-down, malfunctioned or been taken out of service. A significant number of reserve fire-engines were probably being used as others were being repaired. If we got to an eight day strike period then other things could be looked at, but these were fine judgements that had to be taken. Of course journalists were right to ask the Government questions about the contingency arrangements that we had put in place and whether they were as robust as they could be. We would argue that they were working well in the situation that we had found ourselves in - a 48 hour strike. We had always acknowledged that this would be a second best service and he believed people understood that.
Now we were in a strike situation, it was equally legitimate to ask why were we at this position and where the responsibility lay for it taking place. The PMOS pointed out that we had to activate these contingency plans because the FBU had withdrawn their labour, irrespective of the fact that there was an 11 percent pay deal on the table. They had refused to co-operate with the Bain review and to discuss modernisation.
When asked why these reserve engines could not have been sent out two days ago and reports of some deployments, the PMOS said that as he understood it, 15 red engines had been deployed around the country but were not in use. We were taking about augmenting, at the margins, an 830 strong force. If those engines were used then we would have to take people off other engines. There were all the training requirements that had gone on up to this point and the view of the military was that it was best to keep people on the machines on which they were familiar and had been trained. These were fine judgements. There were detailed logistical issues to be addressed. Asked whether that meant these were bad judgements, the PMOS said no. The PMOS firmly believed that the government had done all it could in the situation it had found itself in and to put in place a substitute service - a substitute, but by no means a replacement.
Asked where the 15 engines had come from, the PMOS said they had come from the National Fire Training College. The decision to deploy them had been made in the last few days. They were separate from the reserve which were used by local authorities when others broke down.
Asked whether troops were now being trained to use these engines, when it was previously said that it took three months, the PMOS said that these were the issues that had to be addressed. The engines concerned were not in service at the moment but were being deployed around the country. They had been deployed as a contingency plan. The training for the army to use them had not been completed.
Asked about possible training on the other reserve 85 engines, the PMOS cautioned journalists about getting ahead of themselves. There were 830 Green Goddesses deployed around the country. The troops had been trained since August to use them and that was what had been happening. We would look at the contingency arrangements after the 48 hour strike was over. He made clear that government would not be ruling anything in or out. We recognised that an eight day strike was different territory to a 48 hour one.
Asked about crossing picket lines, the PMOS said that he thought the Deputy Prime Minister had answered that question earlier in the day. When asked what might happen in the future, the PMOS said that should we get to the point where eight days strikes went ahead, and our contingency arrangements were changed in any way, then we would let journalists know. The PMOS made clear this was not a "brush off". All he was saying was that these things would be reviewed. The point the Deputy Prime Minister had been making about picket lines was that the judgement in respect of using red engines was would you be provoking the very thing you were trying to avoid by going in and getting red-engines.
Put to him that the military did not want to cross picket lines and drive red-engines, the PMOS pointed out that we had 19,000 military personnel providing an emergency fire service. It was not simply a question of taking judgements that did not reflect in any way, shape, or form, their training, their views, and their perspective. Asked whether troops might have to overcome their objections, the PMOS said there were real logistical training issues. In addressing those issues, we would obviously be mindful of the view of the military. If we were in an eight day strike situation, then we would look at whether there were other things that could be done or needed to be done to protect public safety. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said he would not be prescriptive about what they could be. As he had already said on a number of occasions, we were not ruling anything in or out at this point. That was where we were.
Asked what might be the way forward as Bain had been completely rejected by fire-fighters. The PMOS said the simple fact was there was an offer there and the issue of modernisation would not and could not be taken off the table. The sensible thing would be for the FBU to say we had had our strike, now let’s get into negotiation and talk with the employers about the pay offer. The PMOS pointed out that Andy Gilchrist had said he had his own plans for modernisation. The PMOS suggested he might bring those to the table. The ball was in the FBU’s court. The PMOS said we could exhort people to get into a talks process, we could encourage people to have a dialogue, but in the end, if they were adamantly against anything at all to do with modernisation or the Bain Report then that was a big difficulty. In the end, as Peter Hain said earlier today, these things were usually resolve via a negotiated settlement. The sooner we got there the better.
Asked whether there was potentially more on the table than 11 percent, the PMOS said as had been made clear at Cabinet this morning, no government could concede to the pay demands the FBU were making without a huge detrimental impact on the economy. The issue of the pay offer and extra pay was inextricably linked with modernisation. There was no more money in the over-all spending envelope, whether there was room for discussion about changes to working practices that could result in a higher pay award was for Andy Gilchrist to find out by talking to his employers.
Asked whether an injunction by the Attorney General - despite the fact that Downing Street had previously said "this was not a runner" was still ruled out, the PMOS said he believed the Attorney General had sent a letter that had been quoted at some length on the lunchtime news in respect of a request he had had from West Yorkshire. The PMOS repeated he would not close down specific options. Asked about strikes at airports, the PMOS said the airports were separate and in a completely different negotiation with BAA. He hoped that it did not result in airports being closed and that the situation could be resolved. Asked whether there was a threat that the military would cross picket lines, the PMOS said he was not threatening anybody. As a Government, we had a responsibility to look at all the different options. That was all he was saying we wanted to do if we had to.
delicious
digg
facebook
