Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Public Sector Pay and Iraq.
Public Sector Pay
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that reports by the Armed Forces, Teachers and Senior Salaries Review Bodies had been published this morning.
On education, the School Teachers Review Body had recommended an increase of 2.9% from April 2003, with 4% for all inner London teachers. This meant that thresholds would have doubled to £4,000 and that a teacher who had started work in 1997 would have seen a salary rise of 68% by September 2003.
The Armed Forces Pay Review Body had recommended increase of 3.2% for the majority of people. There would be an increase of 3.7% for Privates and Lance Corporals on a low pay range.
For Senior Civil Servants, the Senior Salaries Review Body had recommended an increase of 2.25% for each of the three pay ranges below Permanent Secretary level and for senior military officers. An increase of 2.75% had been awarded to the judiciary. Pay increases for MPs and Ministers were linked automatically to the increases in pay bands for the Senior Civil Service. Pay entitlement would rise by 2.25% by 1 April 2003.
The PMOS drew journalists’ attention to a speech the Chancellor had made in Wolverhampton this morning in which he had said, "Here in Britain, we will continue to have the strength to maintain and lock in a tough and disciplined approach to inflation, and take the right long-term decisions for Britain. That is why, just as we must have discipline on pay in the private sector, it was right that there be continued and long-term discipline in the decisions - as today - on public sector pay. And as we look forward to the conclusion of other pay negotiations, let us remind ourselves that every pay settlement must be linked to productivity so that investment in our public services is matched by reform. It is by holding fast to our economic disciplines that Britain, despite the world-wide slowdown, has managed to combine low inflation with high levels of employment".
In answer to questions, the PMOS underlined that the recommendations, which the Government welcomed, were the result of independent reviews. We believed they were firm but fair. We remained strongly of the view that it was important to combine fairness with economic discipline, and that that must apply in the public sector as well as the private sector. He pointed out that, for the first time in a generation, we had seen public sector pay rising faster than private sector pay.
Asked about the pay of Permanent Secretaries, the PMOS said that their salaries were decided by the Permanent Secretaries Remuneration Committee. The range of pay awards would be the same as that agreed for the SCS as a whole.
Asked why we were willing to accept an 11% pay deal for firefighters when teachers were only getting a 2.9% increase, the PMOS reiterated the fact that teachers’ salaries were decided by an independent review body which had reached a decision taking into account the economic picture as a whole. Moreover, in relation the firefighters, it was important to remember that we had said that any increase over and above 4% had to be tied to modernisation and reform. That remained the case. The key to this were two central principles: affordability and productivity increases tied to reform, as the Chancellor had made clear.
Asked if we were concerned that teachers in London might stage another one-day walk out as they had done last October, the PMOS pointed out that teachers in inner-London would receive a 4% pay rise. This would double their threshold to £4,000. In addition, a third of all inner-London teachers would be earning salaries of £34,000+. We recognised the problems of inner London and it was clear that the School Teachers Pay Review body did so too. Asked how we could afford to give teachers in Scotland a 21.2% pay rise, the PMOS said that this was a devolved matter for the Scottish Parliament. It was up to them to work out how much the awards should be and how they would be paid for.
Asked to explain the calculations behind his assertion that a teacher who had started work in 1997 would have seen a salary rise of 68% by September 2003, the PMOS said that the figure of 68% was based on new teachers who had joined the profession in 1997 and had worked their way up the system. Part of that included natural progression through the ranks, but part of it also related to pay awards and bonuses.
Asked about the Lord Chancellor’s salary, the PMOS said that under the terms of the 1996 Ministerial Salaries Order which had been passed by the previous Administration, the Lord Chancellor’s Salary was set at £2,500 more than the salary of the Lord Chief Justice and the two would therefore rise in tandem. Questioned as to whether the Lord Chief Justice would be receiving a pay increase of 2.75% as a member of the judiciary, the PMOS said yes. He referred journalists to the Cabinet Office for further detail.
Iraq
In answer to questions relating to alleged plagiarism concerning the latest Government document on Iraq which had been published last weekend, the PMOS said that it was important to put this story into context. It was imperative for people to understand what the document was about. It was a Government briefing paper based - as stated on its front cover - on a number of sources, including intelligence material. Why had we thought it necessary to publish it? Because we wanted to show people not only the kind of regime we were dealing with, but also how Saddam Hussein had pursued a policy of deliberate deception. Unfortunately, Saddam did not produce an equivalent of the GICS handbook, the Iraqi Year Book or Who’s Who (if he did, he would probably have to change it on a regular basis). We were trying to explain to people why the inspectors were experiencing such problems in finding material and also the lengths to which Saddam had gone to pursue his policy of deception. The first and third sections of the document were based largely on intelligence material. The first section described the extreme lengths to which Saddam had gone to hide his weapons and obstruct the inspectors. The third section of the document described the impact of the regime on the Iraqi people. The second section, which was the part which had been highlighted by the media last night and today, described how the regime was structured. Some of that had been based on Dr Ibrahim al-Marashi’s work which, in retrospect, we should have acknowledged. The fact that we had used some of his work did not throw into question the accuracy of the document as a whole - as Dr Marashi himself had acknowledged on Newsnight last night where he had said that in his opinion the document, overall, was accurate. Nor did it take away from the core argument in the document, particularly in section one which was based on current intelligence, that: Saddam had mounted a deliberate policy of deception; that the inspectors were outnumbered by a ratio of 200:1; that they were under constant surveillance; that there was a deliberate policy of intimidation of scientists and others; and that every effort had been made to obstruct rather than fully comply as 1441 said they should.
Asked repeatedly which Government Department had been responsible for drawing up the document, the PMOS said that the information had been drawn together from a variety of different sources. He had no intention of getting into some big debate about processology. That wasn’t the issue here. The issue was the central argument highlighted in the document - that there was a deliberate policy of deception. No one, from Dr Marashi down, had been able to question the accuracy of that central argument. Asked to confirm that the British intelligence services and FCO officials had drawn up the document, given at least of the names revealed in today’s front page Guardian report appeared to match up with someone who worked for the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and Strategy, the PMOS said that he would decline attempt to draw him into a discussion about processology for obvious reasons. That said, he could confirm that the relevant people had seen the document before it had been published. Asked if he would agree that the document was the result of a "cut’s job by kids in Downing Street’s spin-doctored department", the PMOS said that we had wanted to set out information relating to the membership of the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein did not produce a Who’s Who or give interviews to Jeremy Paxman-type people (although Channel 4 News might say otherwise). Consequently, we had no cuttings on which to base our knowledge. We did, however, have intelligence regarding Saddam’s deliberate policy of deception. We had tried to give people an insight into that intelligence in order to inform their thinking. In our view, there was nothing for which we had to apologise in making that attempt. Questioned as to whether anyone in Downing Street would be disciplined given plagiarism was a very serious offence, the PMOS repeated that we acknowledged that Dr Marashi’s work should have been sourced, but he was not going to get drawn into a processological discussion about this matter.
Asked why we hadn’t acknowledged Dr Marashi’s work from the start, the PMOS repeated that the information contained in the document had been pulled together from a variety of different sources. As he had said, in retrospect we should have acknowledged which parts had come from public sources and which had come from others to clear up any confusion. Ultimately, however, it was important to recognise that our overall objective had been to give as full a picture as we could, not only of the Iraqi regime, but also of its deliberate policy of deception - without in any way compromising the intelligence sources on which the information was based. It was perhaps that which lay at the root of our failure to acknowledge a piece of work which, in retrospect, we should have done.
Put to him that the document was not ‘based’ on Dr Marashi’s work but contained ‘chunks’ of it which had clearly been lifted from his research - some of which was over a decade old, the PMOS repeated that section one, which dealt with Saddam’s policy of deception, was based largely on intelligence, including current intelligence. Similarly with section three, which dealt with the effect of the regime on the Iraqi people. Section two examined the structure of the regime, and it was only part of that which was based on Dr Marashi’s work. It was therefore wrong to proclaim that the whole of the document was untrustworthy. It was not. As Dr Marashi had underlined in his Newsnight interview last night, there was no dispute over the accuracy of section two of the document. The question was whether we should have acknowledged his work which, in retrospect, we admit we should have done.
Asked if the fact that we were using Dr Marashi’s work was proof that we didn’t have our own sources to investigate the structure of the Iraqi regime, the PMOS said no. We had our own sources. However, in drawing up the document, we had to balance the need to try to explain to people the reality of the situation on the ground in Iraq with the need not to compromise intelligence sources. Was there any doubt that there was a policy of deception in Iraq? No. Was there any doubt that the purpose of the structure of the Iraqi Government was to deceive the international community about Saddam’s intentions? No. Dr Marashi wasn’t disputing the accuracy of the document as a whole. His complaint was that we hadn’t acknowledged his work which, we had said, in retrospect we should have done. Asked if the acknowledgement would go up on the Downing Street website, the PMOS said that we would of course look at the document on the website. However, it was important for people to understand that Dr Marashi had not questioned the accuracy of the report as a whole.
Put to him that this incident had ’shattered’ the Prime Minister’s argument in his Newsnight interview yesterday that trust was vital if we were going to go to war, the PMOS said that people’s trust would be shattered if the information contained in the document was found to be inaccurate. No one had said that it was - including Dr Marashi. Equally, the fact that some of it had been sourced while Dr Marashi’s work hadn’t been did not call into question any part of the document. The document was solid and accurate and we stood by it. Asked if we had asked Dr Marashi whether he would allow us to use his research, the PMOS said no and pointed out that his work was publicly available.
Asked for a reaction to Dan Plesch of the Royal United Services Institute who had said that the Government had been trying to deceive people by attempting to give the impression that the information contained in the document was based on British intelligence and was up to date, the PMOS repeated that the first section of the document was based largely on current intelligence. Parts of section two, however, were based on Dr Marashi’s work. The fact that we had not acknowledged his research did not in any way call into question the accuracy of the overall document. Asked if we had pointed out in the document that some of the information which had been used was twelve years old, the PMOS said that while some of the information might have come from an earlier period, it did not call into question the accuracy of the document as a whole. Asked for a reaction to Glenda Jackson’s comment this morning that the Government had misled Parliament, the PMOS said that he would reject the suggestion completely.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister and Downing Street were embarrassed by what had happened, the PMOS said that if he was being asked whether we should have acknowledged Dr Marashi’s work, the answer, in retrospect, was yes. Did that in any way invalidate the core argument of the document? No it did not. Pressed as to whether we were embarrassed by the revelations, the PMOS said that we all had lessons to learn as we went through life. Asked if he would accept that the episode could have an impact on the credibility of any past or future documents we might produce, the PMOS said no.
Asked if we had received any reaction from the US given Colin Powell’s high praise for the document on Wednesday, the PMOS said no. He reminded journalists that Mr Powell had praised the compelling proof that Saddam was involved in deception. Questioned further, the PMOS queried whether journalists were more interested in focussing on processology or substance. In Iraq they knew the information in the document was true. A failure to acknowledge someone’s research did not invalidate an entire piece of work. Nor did it disprove the fact that Saddam was deliberately trying to deceive the international community. Those who tried to suggest otherwise should realise that they were deluding themselves - and recognise that this delusion was more about dogma than reality.
Asked for a reaction to the apparent concessions announced by Iraq overnight, the PMOS said that this was the really serious business of the weekend. The key question was not whether Saddam might make a few gestures or concessions - as we expected he would - aimed at continuing the game of catch as catch can. Rather, the issue was whether there was a fundamental change in his attitude. As Mohammed ElBaradei had said last Thursday, it was not enough for Saddam to comply 90% or even 99%. He had to comply 100%. The test for this weekend was contained in Resolution 1441. Was he going to comply with the unanimous wish of the UN Security Council that he co-operated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with the goal of allowing the inspectors "to remove, destroy and render harmless all prohibited weapons"? It was important for people to remember that this was the man who had had the bare-faced cheek to tell Tony Benn that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. After Dr Blix’s first report to the Security Council last week and Colin Powell’s presentation on Wednesday, surely no one seriously believe him.
Questioned as to whether there was a timetable for getting a second UN Resolution, the PMOS said that the next step in the UN process was Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei’s report to the Security Council on 14 February. People should exercise a little patience and not get too ahead of themselves.
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