Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq, Lord Chancellor, Asylum, Ruud Lubbers, Northern Ireland and Palestinian Reform.
Iraq
Asked the Government’s opinion on the action taken this morning by France, Germany and Belgium to veto NATO’s proposed military assistance to Turkey, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that it was important to put this report into context by making an effort to understand NATO procedure which, while possibly sounding arcane, was actually relevant to the issue. He pointed out that no one had vetoed anything at this point. NATO’s ‘Silence Procedure’ allowed decisions to be taken without discussion. Any Alliance partner was able to break the silence if it wanted to discuss a topic - as France, Germany and Belgium had done today. Consequently, far from vetoing proposals and closing off further discussion, the breaking of the silence allowed further discussion to take place. The PMOS advised that a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had just concluded and Lord Robertson was currently giving a briefing on it. We expected this to be a matter of continuing conversation, possibly even today.
Asked why the US had said over the weekend that any move by a NATO member to break the Silence Procedure would be ’shameful and disgraceful’, the PMOS said that obviously we were disappointed that the issue hadn’t yet been settled. However, the important thing to remember was that discussion was continuing. Nothing had been vetoed. Today’s move by France, Germany and Belgium was not a final decision by any means. Asked to explain why the action by the three countries this morning was not considered a veto when the fact remained that, had they not broken the silence, NATO would have gone ahead with plans to provide military assistance to Turkey, the PMOS explained that a veto was only a veto if it resulted in something never happening. Discussions were continuing about this matter and therefore it would be wrong to apply the term in this case.
Asked how the British Government would react if three important countries vetoed military action against Iraq, given the Prime Minister’s comments last week about the use of ‘unreasonable’ vetoes, the PMOS said that it would not be helpful to speculate about hypothetical scenarios that might or might not come to pass. The Prime Minister had set out his position clearly. This was obviously going to be a rather frustrating week for everyone while we waited for the next report to the UN Security Council by Hans Blix and Muhammed ElBaradei. People had to be patient and let them do their job. They would appear before the UN on Friday to report whether Resolution 1441, which put an obligation on Saddam to comply fully and immediately, was being adhered to.
Asked if the Prime Minister welcomed reports that the Greek Presidency had called for an emergency EU Summit next Monday, the PMOS said that apart from the report on Sky this morning, we had not been made aware of any such plan as yet. As he understood it, a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers next week was possible, but he was not aware of any proposals for anything else at this stage.
Asked to explain our problem with the ’secret plan’ drawn up by France and Germany to bring in additional weapons inspectors, the PMOS pointed out that as both Chancellor Schroeder and the French Government had underlined this morning, this was not a ’secret plan’. Asked to clarify his point, the PMOS repeated that neither the French nor the Germans were portraying this as some secret plan. It appeared to have been ‘over-written’ by some quarters. Nothing had been tabled. The reality was that Resolution 1441, as agreed unanimously by all fifteen members of the Security Council, laid down the standard which the Iraqi regime had to meet - namely, immediate and full compliance. Hans Blix, himself, had said this morning that "The principal problem is not the number of inspectors, but rather the act of co-operation of the Iraqi side, as we have said many times". This was not an adult game of hide-and-seek where Iraq was allowed to go off and hide its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), with the rest of the international community trying to find them. Iraq had to comply actively with the will of the international community under the terms set out in Resolution 1441.
Asked if President Chirac had taken the opportunity at last week’s Anglo-French Summit to discuss with the Prime Minister any ideas to extend the involvement of the weapons inspectors, the PMOS reminded journalists that the French Foreign Minister had talked about the need for more inspectors at the UN in open session last week. Therefore the idea should not come as a surprise to anyone. That said, it was important for people to understand that the issue wasn’t about having more weapons inspectors. It was all about a ‘drastic change of attitude’ on the part of Saddam, as Dr ElBaradei had said in Downing Street last week. Pressed as to whether President Chirac had discussed the Franco-German idea with the Prime Minister, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister and President had obviously discussed the issue of Iraq. However, he had no intention of getting into the detail of their talks. Questioned further about the ’secret plan’, the PMOS repeated that there was no secret plan, as Chancellor Schroeder and the French Government had said this morning. Journalists couldn’t have it both ways. It wasn’t right to report that a secret plan had been hatched behind our backs and then, when it turned out that there was no such plan, to present it as if there had been one. Life didn’t work like that. Asked whether a secret plan had indeed been hatched behind our backs, the PMOS said that he trusted the words of Chancellor Schroeder and the French Government. Put to him that Germany and France were both saying that there was a plan but that it wasn’t ’secret’, the PMOS said that if he was being asked whether a debate was going on about this issue, the answer to that was yes. It was no secret. The media themselves had reported it. However, the underlying question was about the Iraqi regime’s attitude. In the end, what mattered was whether they were co-operating or not. Asked why he was refusing to acknowledge what clearly looked like a plan, the PMOS said that just because something appeared in Der Spiegel and was then reported in the British press did not make it any more of a plan if both Chancellor Schroeder and the French Government had stated categorically that there was no such thing. At the risk of re-igniting a weekend story, he would like to put it on the record that he would rather take Chancellor Schroeder’s word for it than a ‘cut-and-paste’ job by British newspapers.
Asked if there had been any contact between Downing Street and Chancellor’s Schroeder’s Office to discuss the reports of a plan, the PMOS repeated that there was no plan. Nevertheless, it went without saying that we were in regular contact with our German colleagues and were glad to be so. Asked whether the Prime Minister had spoken to Chancellor Schroeder recently, the PMOS said that they spoke on a regular basis, but he was not aware they had spoken over the weekend. Asked if they were intending to speak today, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans for them to do so.
Questioned as to whether Downing Street rejected the Franco-German ‘idea’ which had been drawn up regarding additional weapons inspectors, the PMOS said that as Hans Blix had underlined this morning, the problem was not the number of inspectors. As US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage had said, there was no point in having the inspectors running around in the dark trying to find things in Iraq unless Saddam turned on the light to help them see where they were going. This was not a game of hide-and-seek. Iraq had to co-operate actively to help us find the weapons which they were beginning to admit actually existed. Asked to expound on his last point, the PMOS said that Dr Taha had admitted to the BBC’s Panorama programme that Iraq possessed biological agents but that they had not been weaponised. Thus, the Iraqis were beginning to admit publicly that did have the material we were looking for. Pressed as to whether we rejected the idea of more weapons inspectors, the PMOS said that as we had made clear following the French Foreign Minister’s appearance at the Security Council last week, we did not believe that the number of inspectors was a central issue. Asked if we were rejecting the idea of what was clearly a proactive attempt to force Saddam to disarm by bringing in further inspectors backed up by UN troops, the PMOS said that it was up to the French and German Governments to brief on any ideas they might have. Since they themselves had stated this morning that there was no plan, he had no intention of getting drawn into a point-by-point rebuttal of something about which Der Spiegel had been speculating. The text of 1441 was very clear. It placed the burden on Saddam to co-operate proactively. As Mohammed ElBaradei had said, we were not looking for 90% - or even 99% - co-operation. Saddam had to comply 100%. That was the standard which had been set by the weapons inspectors. The question was whether Saddam and his regime would live up to it.
Asked whether we would call the reports of a plan ‘merely media speculation’ or just an ‘idea’. The PMOS said that he was many things and he spoke on many subjects but he was not a spokesman for either the French or German Governments. Put to him that both appeared to think it was a ‘plan’, the PMOS said that Chancellor Schroeder didn’t seem to think so.
Questioned as to why we were refusing to contemplate the Franco-German idea when it could be a means to averting war, the PMOS said that Resolution 1441 had been written specifically because Saddam had managed to dodge round the previous inspections regime and had held up to ridicule the idea that the international community could contain his possession of WMD. Between 1991 and 1999, UNSCOM had carried out weapons inspections in Iraq. Nevertheless he had managed to hold on to his WMD and develop them still further. Resolution 1441 had been written precisely with that backdrop in mind.
Asked if the Government had any contingency plans to beef up the role of the weapons inspectors in the event that Saddam decided to co-operate - given we had contingency plans in place in the event that he didn’t, the PMOS said the question proved that the journalist had missed the point Hans Blix had been making this morning. They key was not the number of inspectors. The key was Saddam’s attitude.
Asked for a reaction to a report suggesting that Hans Blix believed that it would take a year for his team to complete a proper weapons inspection of Iraq and whether the British Government would accept that view if he expressed it in his report to the UN Security Council on Friday, the PMOS said that it would not be helpful to speculate about what might or might not be said on Friday. Resolution 1441 talked about the need for immediate and full compliance. As the Prime Minister, President Bush and the weapons inspectors had all said, we needed to see a fundamental change in attitude on the part of Saddam. That was the real issue here.
Lord Chancellor
Asked whether the Government believed in the post of the Lord Chancellor, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister fully supported his Lord Chancellor in the work that he did. Asked if that precluded modernisation plans to change the Lord Chancellor’s Department, the PMOS said that we would respond to the report published today in due course. Questioned as to who had persuaded the Lord Chancellor not to accept his pay increase, the PMOS said that the Lord Chancellor’s Department had dealt with questions on this matter over the weekend. He had nothing further to add.
Asylum
Asked whether the Prime Minister’s commitment to reduce the number of asylum seekers was an aspiration or a promise, the PMOS said that in his Newsnight interview on Friday night, the Prime Minister had been summarising the discussions that had been taking place within Government about the issue of asylum. In October 2002, prior to the enactment of the New Asylum and Immigration Act, and before we had started to see the measures we had put place come into force, including joint patrols in France and the new technology we had introduced, the numbers of people applying for asylum in the UK per month were roughly 8,000-9,000. The exact figures would be published on February 28. As a result of the Act and the various measures we had put in place, the Prime Minister had been indicating our hope that we could halve the numbers by September 2003. That was a clear objective, the precise wording of which mattered less than delivering on it. The Prime Minister was galvanising the system in the same way he had with the street crime initiative. Asked if this was a ‘plan’, the PMOS said that what the media called it mattered less that what actually happened. Clearly, if there was one thing people could be sure of it was that this was no secret. Questioned as to whether it was a promise, the PMOS said that it was an aspiration, an objective, an aim and a goal. And no doubt the media would hold the Government to account come September.
Ruud Lubbers
Asked about the Prime Minister’s meeting this evening with Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the PMOS said that discussions would focus mainly on the general issue of refugees, as you would expect. No doubt Iraq would be mentioned in that context. Mr Lubbers was also due to have individual meetings with David Blunkett, Jack Straw and Clare Short during the course of this afternoon.
Questioned as to whether the Government had contingency plans to accommodate Iraqi refugees when the war began, the PMOS pointed out that war had not started - and it was still a question of ‘if’ not ‘when. It went without saying that people would be thinking about the necessary knock-on effects if military action was launched.
Northern Ireland
Asked what the Prime Minister hoped to achieve by going to Northern Ireland this Wednesday, the PMOS said that the agenda remained the same as the one set out in his speech in Belfast on 17 October 2002. Both we and the Irish Government had said that we would return with ideas as to how we might implement the agenda. Wednesday’s visit would be part of that process. We were expecting it to be a significant, although not decisive, meeting. It would provide an opportunity for the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach to run through the principles with each party, one by one, at Hillsborough. We were not expecting to see any immediate results from this meeting, but it was, nevertheless, important.
Asked whether progress had been made since the Prime Minister’s speech last October, the PMOS said that we believed everyone remained seriously engaged. However, we were taking things meeting by meeting, as indeed we had done from the outset of the process. It would not be helpful for anyone to jump ahead and suggest that we were further on than we were. We were currently at the stage of discussing the principles in terms of moving forward. That was what Wednesday was all about. We were not at the stage of presenting a final plan.
Palestinian Reform
Asked when the meeting on Palestinian reform would re-convene, the PMOS said that another meeting was planned, but he was unable to confirm a date at this stage.
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