Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq/Clare Short and Defence.
Iraq/Clare Short
The PMOS advised journalists that the Prime Minister had continued to speak to world leaders and international figures today in his latest round of telephone diplomacy. In the last few days, he had spoken in particular to members of the Security Council. Today he had spoken to Hans Blix and had discussed the idea proposed by other countries that we should define the key areas in which Saddam would have to make progress by the 17 March deadline.
Put to him that, contrary to what he had said at this morning’s press briefing, Clare Short’s office had stated that her views on Iraq had been expressed clearly in her meeting with the Prime Minister last Thursday and that they felt she was being briefed against unfairly by Downing Street, the PMOS said that the issue of the desirability of a second Resolution was a matter which had been discussed on different occasions. It had also discussed the humanitarian situation and reconstruction of Iraq after any conflict, should that come to pass. What had not been discussed, however, was any threat of resignation or any linkage to it. Asked if he was issuing a categorical denial that Ms Short had specifically talked about Iraq being a resignation issue in her personal view, the PMOS said that everyone was agreed on the desirability of a second Resolution. That was why the Prime Minister was continuing to work flat out to find ways in which a second Resolution could be supported. That included defining the key areas where Saddam had to comply. The issue of resignation, however, had not been raised.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister had discussed both the humanitarian situation and the reconstruction of Iraq post-Saddam at his meeting with Clare Short last week, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister was fully aware of the humanitarian and reconstruction issues. We had said on the record that we believed that the UN should have as full a role in this as was possible. How that might be done was currently under discussion. Asked to explain how the UN could be given a role to play in Iraq if the institution was by-passed by the UK and US launching military action without a second Resolution, the PMOS said we had argued consistently that we wanted the backing of the Security Council. Resolution 1441 stated that there would be ’serious consequences’ if Saddam did not comply fully and immediately. Hans Blix’s reports had made it clear that that was not happening. Therefore, the essential question was whether the UN had meant what it said in signing up to the Resolution last November and whether it was prepared to follow it through to its logical conclusion.
Asked if the Prime Minister was planning to speak to Ms Short again today, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans for further conversations. The Prime Minister’s primary concern was to get on with the business of maximising support for the second Resolution and was determined not to be diverted onto other matters. Asked if Downing Street was planning to make any further statements about the matter, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans at this stage to make any further statement.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister was yet in a position to express his full confidence in Ms Short, and if not why he was spending taxpayers’ money on her salary, the PMOS said that he had said all he wanted to say about the issue at this morning’s briefing. He had no intention of getting drawn into playing the journalists’ games. It was important for people to focus their attention on the crucial issue at stake - the need to maximise support for a second Resolution, not only for the sake of Iraq but, perhaps more importantly, for the sake of the future credibility of the UN as an international institution. This would force Saddam to make his choice. Asked if it was possible for a Cabinet Minister to remain in post without enjoying the full confidence of the Prime Minister and whether we really believed that such a situation would help focus minds on the second Resolution, the PMOS said that Clare Short remained a Cabinet Minister and that was all that needed to be said. He pointed out that it was possible to focus on getting a second Resolution if there was a clear set of priorities. That was precisely what the Prime Minister had and was why he was getting on with the job in hand.
Asked the Prime Minister’s view on the UK’s legal position should military action against Iraq be launched without a second Resolution, the PMOS said that it wasn’t our policy to provide a running commentary on legal advice from the Government’s Law Officers. That said, it was clear that any action that was taken would be carried out in accordance with international law.
Asked if the Prime Minister had spoken to President Putin over the last few days, the PMOS said that we were not providing a running commentary on all the conversations the Prime Minister was having. That said, journalists could assume that he had spoken to all the world leaders you would expect him to speak to. Asked for a reaction to reports today that the Russian Foreign Minister had confirmed that Russia would use its veto at the UN, the PMOS said that those who were accustomed to dealing with the UN recognised that what was said in the run-up to a vote was less important than what was done on the day of the vote itself. The outcome of a football match was not judged sixty-minutes into the game. It was usual to wait until the end to do so. Perhaps journalists should take the lesson to heart.
Asked to explain how the proposal to draw up a list to set out clear areas where Saddam needed to comply would work, the PMOS said that since this matter was currently under discussion by the Security Council, in addition to the fact that the original idea had come from elsewhere, he did not think it would be helpful to pre-empt the outcome of the discussions. That said, Hans Blix’s ‘clusters’ document made it clear that Saddam’s lack of co-operation came under the heading of both ‘documents’ and ‘hardware’. Setting key tests related to both in terms of indicating where the material, such as mustard gas, Sarin, VX and anthrax for example, was. We also wanted to see interviews with Iraqi scientists to be conducted outside the country and in such a way that those being interviewed need not fear intimidation by the Iraqi regime or be afraid of repercussions on their families. We were also concerned by the development of a drone with a wingspan of over 7.45m. Clearly there were a number of key areas where there were key questions. The list might be refined over time but we were determined to address the outstanding issues. Questioned as to whether the key tests would result in several ‘mini deadlines’, the PMOS pointed out that for the past twelve years we had been asking Iraq for evidence to back up their claims that they had destroyed their chemical and biological weapons and material. Our request for that evidence had become more urgent with the passing of Resolution 1441 last November. It was clearly not - and should not be - a matter of time. As Dr ElBaradei had said today, it was about a fundamental change of heart. We had not see any evidence of that so far either.
Asked whether the Prime Minister had asked Dr Blix to draw up the list, the PMOS pointed out that since Dr Blix was the author of the ‘clusters’ document which had been published last Friday, he was obviously the person best placed to advise on how such a list, which contained twenty nine different categories of questions (over a hundred questions in all), could be pared down to key areas. That was the process which the Prime Minister had been speaking to him about in their telephone conversation today.
Questioned as to whether 17 March was the final deadline, the PMOS said that it was possible that some of our colleagues on the Security Council would want more time. Obviously we would listen to their case. At the moment, however, 17 March was the only date set down in any Resolution. It had to be a tight deadline because, as Saddam had shown in the past, it was the only way he would bow to pressure and make his choice between disarmament and exile.
Asked if it was true that the Prime Minister had been slow-handclapped by some of the twenty people who had been interviewing him today for a special ‘Tonight with Trevor MacDonald’ programme to be broadcast this evening, the PMOS said that given we had agreed that the twenty should be strong critics of military action, people should not be surprised if they turned out to be critical. The Prime Minister wanted to be seen to put his case to those who were most hostile to it. He believed strongly in his argument and in the position he had adopted and he wanted to address what were clearly genuine concerns.
Defence
Asked for a reaction to Geoff Hoon’s call in a speech today for a new Defence White Paper, the need to have radically different armed forces in the future and whether he had been signalling a second Strategic Defence Review, the PMOS said that the speech was a result of a body within the MoD which had been encouraged to think ‘outside the box’ about the way to deal with potential threats. It did not mean we believed that any of the threats would definitely come to pass. However, we thought it was necessary to try to think through the issues we might face one day. Mr Hoon’s speech should be regarded in that spirit rather than a detailed action plan on which we would start work tomorrow. Asked if a new Defence White Paper was being planned, the PMOS said that there would be follow-through from the exercise, as you would expect. However, it would take time. Nothing was imminent.
delicious
digg
facebook
