Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq and Duchess of York.
Iraq
Asked if the Prime Minister had had a meeting with the Attorney General at lunchtime today, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that the Prime Minister had had a number of meetings with ministerial colleagues today on the issue of Iraq. Given the Attorney General had been seen walking into Downing Street, it could be assumed that he had attended some of them. Asked who had attended the meetings, the PMOS declined to provide a complete castlist on the grounds that we never briefed on the Prime Minister’s meetings with Ministers. Asked if the Ministers who had attended today’s meeting were members of the Prime Minister’s ‘War Cabinet’, the PMOS said no. There wasn’t a ‘War Cabinet’ for the very simple reason that we were not in a conflict situation. Almost the entirety of the Prime Minister’s day was being spent on issues relating to Iraq, be it face-to-face meetings with European colleagues, phonecalls with Security Council partners or meetings with Ministerial colleagues. Those discussions were covering a whole gamut of different issues, as you would expect. Asked whether the Prime Minister was seeing Ministers individually or in groups, the PMOS said that he was meeting some individually and some collectively.
Asked to provide details of the legal advice given to the Prime Minister by the Attorney General on going to war without a second Resolution, the PMOS said that that he had no intention of breaching the long standing convention of not revealing the legal advice we received from the Attorney General. Asked if every member of the Cabinet had been made aware of the Attorney General’s legal advice, the PMOS said that he hadn’t made a presentation to the Cabinet.
Asked for a reaction to reports from the US that the White House was pushing for a UN vote this week, the PMOS said that we too were expecting a vote to take place this week. Asked if that might happen on Thursday, the PMOS said that he was unable to be more specific at this stage because we were in a dynamic, fluid, diplomatic situation. We understood the desire for certainty, but it would not be helpful to speculate about what might or might not happen at this point. Questioned further, the PMOS said that intensive discussions were continuing amongst Security Council members, not least conversations the Prime Minister was having with representatives of different countries. That process had yet to come to a conclusion. Asked if Britain’s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, had been signalling today that a deadline for the end of this month might be imposed on Saddam, the PMOS said that the only date set down in the draft Resolution was 17 March. However, as Sir Jeremy had pointed out this morning, there was nothing ‘magic’ about it. In our discussions with Security Council colleagues, minds were open about the issue of more time. However, if we were talking about going beyond the proposed 17 March date, we were clearly not talking about going beyond it by very much. People accepted that Saddam only responded to the maximum amount of pressure placed on him, hence the need to impose a tight deadline. One of the issues currently under discussion flowed from Hans Blix’s ‘clusters’ document, published last Friday. The proposal being floated at the UN and in conversations was to set tests against which the Security Council could make a judgement about Saddam’s compliance. Those discussions were continuing.
Asked if a second Resolution was legally necessary, the PMOS said we had underlined from the outset that any action that was taken would be in accordance with international law. The Prime Minister had spoken on many occasions about our preference and desire for a second Resolution. He remained confident that it could be achieved. That was why we were pushing so hard to find common ground. Pressed as to whether Downing Street was ‘unambiguously clear’ that a second Resolution was not legally necessary, the PMOS said that we were pushing ahead to secure a second Resolution. That was where all our efforts and energy were focussed at the moment.
Asked to explain why the Prime Minister remained so confident that a second Resolution would be achieved, the PMOS said that he believed strongly in the logic of his argument. In his view, people had to face up to the consequences of what they had signed up to in Resolution 1441 - that, in the event of continued Iraqi-non-compliance, ’serious consequences’ would follow. He also believed that the UN should mean what it said so as to ensure that it did not crumble into irrelevance because its writ was unable to run. Clearly, we were in a situation of high-diplomacy and high-politics. We would have to wait and see how things panned out. Asked the point of getting a majority in a Security Council vote on the second Resolution, only to see France and Russia veto it, the PMOS said that things were often different on the day of a vote when people had to put their cards on the table. He accepted that the situation might look pretty difficult in the light of President Chirac’s comments last night saying essentially that he would veto anything at any time. However, it was important for people to be patient and wait and see how we moved forward. Asked if he was implying that the Prime Minister was no longer confident that he would get a second Resolution, the PMOS said no.
Asked if the Government believed that international law would allow the US and UK to launch military action against Iraq in the event that the second Resolution was vetoed at the UN, the PMOS said that this was a hypothetical scenario. At the moment, we were still seeking to get a second Resolution and were straining every sinew to do so. We were engaged in intensive diplomacy and that was where all our efforts were focussed. Pressed further, the PMOS underlined that whatever course of action the UK Government decided to take, it would, of course, be consistent with international law. Asked what the legal basis would be for military action under the terms of 1441 and the UN Charter, the PMOS said that he wasn’t a lawyer. Should we reach a point where we had to explain a particular course of action and why it was being followed, then obviously we would do so. However, we were not there yet. Put to him that if the UN had really wanted to sanction the use of force it would have authorised ‘all necessary means’ rather than ’serious consequences’ as set out in Resolution 1441, the PMOS cautioned journalists against getting too far ahead of themselves at this juncture. Our aim was to ensure that Saddam Hussein was able to comply voluntarily and peacefully in a process of disarmament in a manner which gave the necessary confidence and satisfaction to Security Council members that he had had the fundamental change of heart that was required of him. The choice would be his, but not forever.
Questioned about the use of an unreasonable veto, the PMOS said that we would have to wait and see what had happened in the vote. For a country to declare that it would use its veto, whatever the circumstances, in our view sent a message to Saddam that he was off the hook. It would also be a pretty odd thing to do. Asked if he was saying that France’s veto would indeed be unreasonable, the PMOS said he was suggesting that it was a curious state of affairs to say that whatever the Resolution and whatever the reaction it would be vetoed.
Asked to characterise the Prime Minister’s relationship with President Chirac, the PMOS said that he was not going to pretend that we were on the same page as the French about Iraq. Self-evidently we were not. President Chirac had set out his latest thinking last night regarding the course which he believed France should take. However, as the Prime Minister had said this morning, he did not believe it particularly helpful for the French to say that they would use their veto regardless of the way things turned out and how Iraq might respond, while at the same time acknowledging that Iraq wasn’t co-operating sufficiently. We had to accept that France had historically taken a different position on Iraq. For example, they had abstained on Resolution 1284 which had set up UNMOVIC in the first instance. They had, however, signed up to Resolution 1441, together with fourteen other members of the Security Council. 1441, it should be remembered, called for full and immediate Iraqi co-operation and compliance. President Chirac himself had commented last night that he didn’t believe Saddam’s co-operation was sufficient. Asked whether the Prime Minister was ready to concede that developing a European defence identity with the French would undermine NATO given recent events, the PMOS said no. He pointed out that a lot of good work had been done at the Anglo-French Summit in Le Touquet at the beginning of February on the development of a European defence identity. It was important to understand what was being proposed. This was about being able to react to humanitarian and crisis situations where NATO was not involved.
Asked whether Dr Blix would continue to have a role to play if the proposal to set down benchmarks against which Saddam’s compliance would be judged was accepted, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had spoken to Dr Blix about the plan yesterday. It was a question of evidence being put before the Security Council and the Security Council itself making the necessary judgements. That had always been the case. Nevertheless, Dr Blix’s role remained an important one.
Asked for a reaction to an Evening Standard report today claiming that the Defence Minister, Lewis Moonie, had commented that war was "pretty damned inevitable", the PMOS said that as he understood it, the Standard had missed the second half of Dr Moonie’s sentence which was "….if Saddam does not comply". He believed that had already been pointed out to the newspaper.
Duchess of York
Asked why the Duchess of York had visited Downing Street today, the PMOS said that she had not met the Prime Minister. Nor was her visit Iraq-related. Asked if she had met Mrs Blair, the PMOS said that he did not give details of Mrs Blair’s diary.
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