News

Thursday 3 April 2003

PMOS afternoon briefing - 2 April

Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq.

Iraq

Asked if was true that Saddam was on his deathbed, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said the honest answer was we didn’t know if he was dead, alive or injured. It was interesting to note that his statement yesterday had been delivered by another member of his regime. It had also been reported today that Saddam had had a meeting with his ‘top officials’, but again it was interesting that this report had not been accompanied by the usual TV footage. It would appear that Saddam had, temporarily at least, made himself scarce. In the meantime, we were pressing on with the campaign, which would not be concluded until the Coalition had achieved all of its objectives.

Asked if we were near the ‘tipping point’, the PMOS said that in his Ministerial meeting on Iraq yesterday morning, the Prime Minister had set out the three phases to the conflict. In the first instance that had been to get a strategic grip on Iraq. We had then moved on to the steady advance phase on which progress was being made as the Coalition continued to move towards Baghdad. Just as the Prime Minister had paid tribute to UK forces and their work in the South of the country, he would also want to draw attention to the professionalism of the US forces as they advanced on Baghdad. Questioned further, the PMOS said that it was important not to allow reporting to get ahead of the reality on the ground. We had not yet reached the end game. There were still big challenges and hurdles to overcome. Further sacrifices would have to be made and there would also be further casualties which we would have to bear. As he had said on Monday, the Prime Minister did not get too carried away by success, nor overcome by problems and difficulties. We remained completely focussed on achieving our objectives, namely to remove Saddam and his regime, to rid Iraq of WMD and remove the threat to the wider world - and, in doing so, to liberate the Iraqi people and help restore good governance inside Iraq with due respect for human rights. The campaign would not be over until these objectives were achieved in full.

Asked whether the Prime Minister’s pre-recess Statement to the House on Iraq would be this week, the PMOS said that he was likely to make his Statement next week. Questioned as to whether Parliament’s Easter recess would be going ahead from 14-28 April, the PMOS said that was the plan, as far as he was aware. Asked whether Parliament would be recalled if there were significant developments, the PMOS said that he didn’t have a crystal ball and was unable to predict what might happen during the break. At the moment, the plan was for the House to rise on Monday 14 April.

Asked about post-Saddam issues, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had pointed out, there would be three phases. In an immediate post-conflict Iraq, the military would de facto be in charge. Subsequent to that, there would be an obvious desire to move as quickly as possible to an interim Iraqi authority and then to a fully representative government by the Iraqi people, for the Iraqi people. The international community was in full agreement about what the ends should be. The role of different countries and international organisations, such as the UN, in reaching that point was something that was currently being discussed.

In answer questions about the constitution of the immediate post-conflict and interim administration, the PMOS said it was true that there were some differences of view pertaining to this particular matter as the Prime Minister had set out. It was going to be one of those issues where there would be a fairly significant amount of quiet diplomacy taking place without detailed positions being set out in public as we tried to reconcile people’s views and attempt to draw everyone together. It should not be beyond the wit of the international community if the will was there - which it was - to work out the means to the ends, i.e. a government for the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people. That was currently under discussion. There was a shared view of where we wanted to end up. If we all had a clear focus on how to achieve it, then the other issues we would encounter along the way should not prove too problematic.

Asked the timescale for the interim administration, the PMOS said that we were not yet at the point where we were able to talk about timeframes. Work was ongoing on this matter as you would expect. He also dragged people back to the fact that the military conflict had not yet concluded. The Prime Minister had set things out as far as he could during PMQs earlier today. It would take time to work out all the detail. Our focus at the moment was on prosecuting the military campaign to a successful conclusion and to look after the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people as best we could. Put to him that it wouldn’t be healthy to allow the interim administration to drag on for months, the PMOS said that of course everyone wanted to see a representative government in Iraq as quickly as possible - consistent with the desire to ensure due order and due process. At this stage, however, he was unable to put a timescale on how long that might last. Put to him that the interim administration in Afghanistan had operated for around six months and whether he thought that was an acceptable period of time, the PMOS said it was pointless to start predicting how long the interim administration in Iraq might last. The military campaign would take as long as it took. In terms of what happened after that, a significant amount of diplomatic traffic was going on as you would expect, not only between the British and US Governments, but also with the French and the Russians, as evidenced by the Prime Minister’s telephone conversations with President Chirac and President Putin last weekend.

Asked about senior Coalition figures taking a role post-conflict and reports concerning the former US General, Jay Garner, the PMOS referred journalists to the Pentagon website which stated that Jay Garner would head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), a US body helping to deliver humanitarian aid and re-stabilise public services infrastructure and civil administration as soon as possible. There were six British officials working alongside ORHA, which, as the organisation itself had made clear, was a temporary body. Its remit was to work towards an interim authority as quickly as possible. The post-conflict military role was already being observed in parts of Southern Iraq where we were beginning to see signs of normalisation as a result of the military’s work in helping to re-open schools, hospitals and marketplaces. Questioned as to whether the immediate post-conflict administration would be run solely by the US, the PMOS said that, post-conflict, the military would de facto be in charge. He pointed out that British troops were on the ground in Iraq. ORHA was an American organisation which had a presence in Kuwait and Washington. Six British officials, drawn from a range of Government Departments, were working alongside it to ensure that the UK’s views were represented. Questioned as to whether the British would take charge of the areas around Basra and Umm Qasr, the PMOS pointed out that the military campaign in Iraq had yet to conclude and cautioned journalists against getting too far ahead of themselves at this stage. Clearly, British forces were already playing a significant part in helping to normalise some areas in Southern Iraq.

Asked whether the interim Iraqi administration would be Iraqi or American, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had talked forcefully in the House today about Iraqi involvement. Put to him that countries did not share the overall vision for Iraq, the PMOS strongly disagreed and said that they did. What everyone wanted to see was a representative government by the Iraqi people, for the Iraqi people, as soon as possible. He said he had sketched out the routemap outlining how that might be achieved, but he was unable to ink in details and timelines since discussions were still going on. He also took journalists back to what had been agreed at the Azores Summit and at Camp David, particularly in relation to the UN.

Asked if the Prime Minister drew a distinction between Donald Rumsfeld’s view on Iran and Syria and what other parts of the US Administration were saying about the matter, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had made our position clear at PMQs regarding the issue of Iran and Syria. We were in discussion with our coalition allies about the concerns that had been raised. However, it was important to recognise that this conflict was about Iraq and that was where we were focussing our attention.

Asked if the Prime Minister spoke to President Bush by phone every day, the PMOS said yes, more or less. Asked what proportion of the Prime Minister’s time was being take up with Iraq, the PMOS said that obviously the majority of the Prime Minister’s time was being taken up with the military campaign. However, given the Budget was next Wednesday, he was also talking to the Chancellor, as you would expect, in addition to focussing on the issue of Northern Ireland. Some of his time was also being devoted to other parts of the domestic agenda, although clearly not as much as usual.

Asked for a reaction to Tam Dalyell’s claim today that the Prime Minister’s statement at PMQs that the Iraqi military had deliberately damaged holy sites in the 1991 Gulf War was false, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister would not have said what he had said unless it was based on briefing which he had received from the Government machine.

Asked for a reaction to a report in the Independent in which it had been claimed that parts of a missile which had bombed a marketplace in Iraq were discovered to have born US serial numbers, the PMOS reminded journalists that there had been two bomb incidents relating to marketplaces. Investigations were continuing into what had happened regarding both. Obviously we were further forward on the first inquiry than the second. There was no evidence present as yet to suggest that either was the result of coalition munitions. As we had said over the weekend, intelligence reports showed that Saddam had replaced his Air Defence Commander because of a failure of Iraq’s surface-to-air missiles, some of which had fallen back on areas of Baghdad. It was also clear that the places where the munitions had fallen had been sanitised before journalists had been taken there. All he was saying at this stage was that this was a possible explanation for what had happened. He was not claiming it to be definitive. Nevertheless, it was important for people to remember that we had always put our hands up in the past when mistakes had been made.

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