Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq/BBC.
Iraq/BBC
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) distributed copies of a written statement from the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and Strategy, Alastair Campbell. Asked if the purpose of the statement was to take the heat out of the whole issue, the PMOS said that we had never seen this as a vendetta, a battle or anything else against the BBC. We were simply asking them to answer the questions that we had put. Did they accept that there was no evidence to support their claims that we had inserted the 45-minute intelligence, that we had done so knowing it to be wrong and against the advice of the intelligence agencies? As Mr Campbell’s statement today made clear, we were looking for recognition of that fact. The ball was in the BBC’s court.
Asked if Downing Street was now actively looking for a clarification rather than an apology from the BBC, the PMOS said that we had apologised for a mistake regarding the February document, as was right and proper. We believed that others should have the good grace to do the same. Everyone was capable of making mistakes, and we had probably all done so at some point in our lives. Equally, however, it was important for people to put up their hands and acknowledge when they had made an error, as indeed we had done. Asked exactly what our dispute was with the BBC now, the PMOS underlined that, contrary to the way some wanted to present this, the matter had nothing to do with the BBC Charter. Nor was it about the BBC’s reporting of the war. Indeed, while it was true that we had reservations about some aspects of BBC reports during the conflict, Mr Campbell himself had expressed the view to the FAC that he regarded much of the BBC’s reporting during the war as excellent and amongst the best in the world. Our complaint against the BBC had always been specific. It had been alleged that we had inserted material into the dossier, that we had done so knowing it was wrong and against the advice of the intelligence agencies. That was completely and utterly false, which was why we were asking the BBC to set the record straight.
Asked why the Government continued to insist that the allegations were untrue when no one seemed to be in a position to disprove them, the PMOS said that there was no evidence to support the BBC’s claims, whereas there was a substantial body of evidence to support the counter view. We were simply asking the BBC to reflect that fact. They had claimed that we had inserted the 45-minute intelligence into the September dossier. The Chairman of the JIC and the heads of the intelligence agencies had all said that that was not true, as had the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) - and even Sir John Stanley. When the weight of opinion was as one-sided as this, surely this was something the BBC should acknowledge. No matter what the BBC source had said, what mattered in the end was that the source did not sit on the JIC and therefore did not have access to the whole picture. Put to him that the FAC had not agreed unanimously with the conclusion that Mr Campbell had not played a role in the inclusion of the 45-minute claim, the PMOS said that he was merely making the point that there was no evidence - and no member of the FAC was suggesting that there was any evidence - to support the BBC’s claims. Sir John Stanley, had also stated that he did not believe the BBC was right. As the FAC’s report made clear, there was no new evidence to suggest that the allegations were true.
Asked if Downing Street was considering taking any further course of action should the BBC continue to refuse to answer the questions being put, the PMOS repeated that the ball was in the BBC’s court. We would wait and see how they would respond. Put to him that the BBC had already issued a response, the PMOS pointed out that they had not given a considered a response to the FAC report which had only been published today. Nor had they answered the questions we had put to them. Put to him that the BBC had given a full response this morning, the PMOS said that they had not addressed the central point in terms of accepting that there was no evidence to support their claims. Challenged that the BBC had responded this morning by saying that they would have to disagree with Downing Street, the PMOS said that we would ask them to reflect further on the report. Asked to explain why the BBC should give a considered response to the report when there was nothing in it for them to respond to, the PMOS said that the BBC Governors had issued a statement last night - before the publication of the FAC report. Given the fact that the report had stated today that there was no new evidence to support the BBC’s original claims, one would think that the BBC would want to reconsider these issues and think again as to whether they wanted to continue to allege that Downing Street had inserted the 45-minute intelligence, that we had done so knowing that it was wrong and against the wishes of the intelligence community. Put to him that the Committee had not been given any evidence to support either view, the PMOS said that he would disagree. The Committee’s conclusions reflected the fact that Foreign Secretary fully supported Mr Campbell’s position. That was new evidence. Put to him that it was an assertion rather than evidence, the PMOS said that it was an assertion backed up by the Chairman of the JIC and heads of the intelligence services. Put to him that the Chairman of the JIC and heads of the intelligence services had not appeared before the FAC, the PMOS pointed out that the statements to the Committee by Mr Campbell and Mr Straw had been endorsed by the Chairman of the JIC. Challenged that there was no solid evidence, the PMOS said that the word of the JIC Chair was enough for him. Questioned as to whether he was really suggesting that people accept the word of Mr Campbell just because he had said that his evidence was endorsed by the head of the JIC, the PMOS pointed out that Mr Campbell’s evidence had not been contradicted by the head of the JIC. Challenged that that was hardly surprising in the light of the fact that it wasn’t the convention for the Chairman to give evidence to a Select Committee, the PMOS said that what had happened had happened. He repeated that Mr Campbell’s evidence had been supported fully by the Chairman of the JIC. Questioned repeatedly as to how the public could be sure that that was the case, the PMOS said that it had been conveyed in the appropriate way to the FAC. Asked if the ‘appropriate way’ meant through Alastair Campbell’s evidence, the PMOS said yes - and more, that Mr Campbell had not been contradicted by anyone. Put to him that such evidence would not be considered acceptable in a court of law, the PMOS said that the appropriate forum in which to discuss these matters was the ISC, which had been set up by a previous Administration.
Asked if an inquiry would be set up to try to find out who Andrew Gilligan’s source in the intelligence services was, the PMOS said that he was unable to comment on intelligence matters for obvious reasons. Put to him that it was a leak inquiry not an intelligence issue, the PMOS said that it was intelligence-related. He was not a spokesman for the intelligence services.
Asked if Downing Street was as concerned about the Committee’s conclusions regarding the Government’s reasons for going to war as it was with the conclusions regarding the Government/BBC spat, the PMOS said that the reasons for going to war had been set out in the dossier which had been produced as a result of an ongoing process within the JIC, which we fully respected. It went without saying that the intelligence assessments had been made in the most rigorous way possible. The only way to assess how accurate the intelligence was, was by allowing the Iraq Survey Group to get on with its work, which was why it was important for the group to be given the time and space to do its job properly. Put to him that Downing Street appeared to have changed its position on WMD, the PMOS said that he would disagree. He saw no distinction between letting the Iraq Survey Group do its work and our confidence that WMD would be discovered. Indeed, we remained confident that WMD would be found, but it was only through the Iraq Survey Group that it could happen. Clearly it would take time, not only because of the large-scale exercise that was being undertaken, but because it was also necessary to win the trust of Iraqi scientists who held information about the WMD programme.
Questioned as to whether the Government had passed on intelligence to the IAEA about Saddam’s alleged attempts to procure uranium from Niger, the PMOS said that the UK investigations into the uranium claims had been self-contained. Put to him that our failure to pass on intelligence was a breach of our obligations under various UN Security Council Resolutions, the PMOS said that we were fully aware of our UN obligations.
Asked if Downing Street accepted the FAC’s view that the Prime Minister had misrepresented the February document, the PMOS said that the Committee’s report recognised that the row over the attribution of the second section of the paper was unfortunate because the facts contained within it were important. Moreover, the intelligence contained in the first and third sections had been specifically cleared by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and contained new information. We did not believe, therefore, that the Prime Minister had misrepresented anything to Parliament. Asked if he recognised the 10% figure which the FAC had put on the second section, the PMOS said that we would deal with this matter in our detailed response to the report. Asked when that might be, the PMOS said that we would respond within the usual timescale and in the normal way.
In answer to questions about Alastair Campbell’s status and whether it was right for the Foreign Secretary to speak on Mr Campbell’s behalf when it should be the other way around, the PMOS said that Mr Campbell’s position remained unchanged. The attack on his role had also been attack on the integrity of the Government. It was therefore entirely appropriate for the Foreign Secretary to issue comment in the context of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report. There was nothing surprising about that.
Asked by the BBC if he would agree that most of the Committee’s conclusions were negative if the sections about Mr Campbell were disregarded and that the FAC had not demurred from the suggestion that the September document had been ’sexed-up’, the PMOS said that he would disagree in the strongest possible terms with the premise of the question. No doubt the BBC would love to set aside all the original claims, but quite frankly that wasn’t possible. Moreover, all sides of the Committee had agreed that "the claims made in the September dossier were in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then available". That in no way could be regarded as a negative conclusion. Put to him that the Committee had also stated that the Executive Summary had been a lot harder than the language of the actual intelligence material itself, the PMOS pointed out that the Executive Summary had been written by the JIC. Its assessment would have been based on the same rigorous process of assessment as the rest of the report. Put to him that the Committee had had to say that "the claims made in the September dossier were in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then available" because the only other possible conclusion, due to the lack of evidence, was that the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Government had lied, the PMOS pointed out that since the Committee hadn’t said it, it was obviously not true.
Asked if the Prime Minister was considering setting up an FBI-style crime-fighting security agency, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had stated in his speech today, it was important to look at how we could co-ordinate all the various agencies that already existed. How that might be done was a matter for further thought.
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