Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Guantanamo Bay, Iraq/WMD, BBC and Parliamentary Ombudsman.
Guantanamo Bay
Asked if the Prime Minister was for or against a US military tribunal, the PMOS said that the position had not changed. We had pressed the US consistently to reach a decision on how to deal with the detainees. They had subsequently announced that six of them could face military commissions. Two of the six were British. The designations were the start of a process which might lead to military commissions. It meant that the individuals concerned were now subject to the order governing military commissions and could therefore be charged and prosecuted. That, however, was not automatic, which was why it was important to wait and see how the process unfolded. We had made it clear to the US that the detainees should be treated humanely and, if prosecuted, should receive a fair trial. We had also made our views on the death penalty very clear. We had strong reservations about military commissions. These reservations had been - and would continue to be - raised with the US. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary had spoken to Colin Powell about this matter twice within the last week. Asked if the Prime Minister would raise the issue with President Bush next week, the PMOS said that we never briefed on discussions in advance. That said, it was clear that this matter had been - and would continue to be - raised at various levels.
Asked why we were deferring to the Americans when the detainees had been captured in territory which had been just as much under the UK’s jurisdiction as the US’s, the PMOS said we had acknowledged that this was a highly unusual and difficult situation. It was all the more complex because of the information flowing from the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, which was clearly important in the war against international terror. Obviously we wanted to bring things to an end as swiftly as possible. At this moment in time, however, the detainees had not been charged, and we had no intention of discussing individual cases. In the end, what mattered was the fact that the US was the detaining authority.
Questioned as to whether the British Government would be in favour of repatriating the British detainees and putting them on trial in the UK, the PMOS repeated that the detainees had not yet been charged. Nor did he have any intention of getting into a discussion about individual cases. The important point was that the US was the detaining authority.
Questioned as to whether the British Government had put forward an alternative proposal if we were so doubtful about the military commissions, the PMOS repeated that the US was the detaining authority. Besides, the detainees had yet to be charged. In the meantime, we were continuing to raise our concerns, as the Foreign Secretary had done with his American counterpart twice in the past week. Asked if the Government believed that the British detainees should be given access to a lawyer, the PMOS said yes. The detainees had the option of engaging civilian lawyers. However, since British lawyers would have difficulty in operating under the US court legal system, any lawyer would have to be a US citizen approved by the US authorities because of the sensitivity of the information.
Iraq/WMD
Asked if the Government continued to believed that WMD would be found in Iraq, the PMOS said he appreciated that this question was being asked as a result of another story based on another anonymous source, although he accepted that this one probably did not meet Andrew Marr at a central London hotel on 22 May. He pointed journalists to the authentic voice of the person at the top of the Government - the Prime Minister - who was on the record as saying to the Liaison Committee on Tuesday that, "The proposition of people like you is simply this: that Saddam, having taken sanctions on himself, military action on himself, with all the problems that he had having chucked the inspectors out voluntarily, got rid of the weapons. I don’t believe that, and I’m quite sure the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will prove that thesis to be wrong".
Asked to explain the difference between actual WMD and evidence of WMD programmes, the PMOS said the Prime Minister remained absolutely confident that we would find material that, had it been discovered by Hans Blix, would have justified him going back to the UN Security Council and for a further UN Resolution to issue. The Prime Minister was also absolutely confident that we would find evidence not only of Saddam’s WMD programmes, but concrete evidence of the products of those programmes as well. The PMOS said that he had no intention of pre-judging the work of the ISG, who had only just started to operate in Iraq. It had 1,200 members when up to full strength and had a systematic programme of work. Clearly it had a big and important job to do. We should let them do it. We continued to stand by what the Prime Minister had said. If he had to amplify this today, he had had to do so because of a story based on another anonymous BBC source. Asked if he was putting Mr Marr’s report into the same category as Andrew Gilligan’s report, the PMOS said that he was simply making a general observation. Put to him that he seemed to be implying that Mr Marr’s report had as little validity as Mr Gilligan’s, the PMOS said that he wasn’t implying anything. He was simply stating that that the person at the top of the Government was the Prime Minister. He had absolute confidence that we would find evidence not only of the WMD programmes in Iraq, but also concrete evidence of the products of those programmes. In answer to further questions, the PMOS pointed out that the Prime Minister had spoken about WMD programmes many times in the past. He drew journalists’ attention to Hansard 24 September 2002, for example, in which the Prime Minister was quoted as saying, "The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down. It is up and running now". He had also referred to WMD programmes several more times on that day. There were many other quotes.
Asked why he appeared to be placing Mr Marr’s source in the same box as Mr Gilligan’s when Mr Marr was clearly a more experienced journalist than Mr Gilligan, the PMOS said that he was not criticising Mr Marr. The authentic voice at the top of Government was the Prime Minister who had said what he had said about the subject on the record on Tuesday. By any standards, that should surely carry more weight.
Asked if ‘products’ meant finished products, i.e. complete weapons, or unfinished products, such as components, the PMOS said that he was not going to pre-judge the outcome of the ISG’s work. Time would tell on this. The Prime Minister had given a public undertaking to bring forward the evidence. It would show that Saddam had been a threat - and would have continued to be a threat had we not, rightly, taken the action we had. Asked repeatedly to define the word ‘products’, the PMOS said that he had no intention of going any further on this matter than he had already gone. We continued to stand by all the evidence contained in the September dossier. As we had stated repeatedly, Saddam and the issue of WMD was not something which had been chanced upon by the UK, US and the international community last September. It had been a live issue since the gassings at Halabja, the last Gulf War and the twelve years of sanctions and defiance of the international community. As a result of various UN Resolutions, the military pressure on Saddam and the return of the weapons inspectors, there had clearly been a sustained programme of concealment, as indeed the February briefing paper had shown. We were confident that we would find the evidence which, had it been discovered by Hans Blix and UNMOVIC, would have justified them going back to the UN Security Council and for another UN Resolution to issue. The PMOS insisted that he was absolutely not going to get into the business of defining what it was that the ISG might or might not find. If he was being asked about WMD programmes and the products of those programmes, he had already answered the points which had been raised. Pressed as to whether he had made the claim on the basis of new intelligence which the Prime Minister had received, the PMOS repeated what the Prime Minister had told the Liaison Committee on Tuesday. Put to him that he was inviting the suggestion that his claim was merely an aspiration, the PMOS underlined that the Prime Minister was absolutely confident that the evidence would be found. The Prime Minister was the Prime Minister. It was his job as the Official Spokesman to reflect his views - and that was exactly what he was doing. Put to him that journalists were entitled to know the basis of the Prime Minister’s confidence, the PMOS said that he was confident on the basis and understanding of Saddam Hussein and the issue of WMD. Asked if he stood by his colleague’s reply to a correspondent at the time of Robin Cook’s resignation when he had said that he was absolutely confident that, in time, WMD would be found, the PMOS said that he had already given the Government’s position on this matter. Challenged that the Government’s position had changed, the PMOS said he thought that others would put a different interpretation on what he had said. As a result of the weapons inspectors’ return and the military pressure on Saddam, we knew that there had been a programme of concealment inside Iraq. Our knowledge of this would become far greater in the weeks and months to come as the ISG carried out its work. We had no doubt that Saddam had had WMD. In fact, there was no credible intelligence agency anywhere in the world that disputed this fact. We would bring forward the evidence, as the Prime Minister himself had underlined we would do. We could then have a debate about it. This all seemed a bit premature in his eyes.
Asked if we agreed with Donald Rumsfeld’s comments yesterday that the US had gone to war against Iraq, not because of new intelligence, but because it viewed existing intelligence in a new post-September 11 light, the PMOS said he was sorry to give a bit of a history lesson, but that was where we appeared to be. He reminded journalists that even before September 11 the Prime Minister had pointed to an Iraqi threat from WMD and had underlined that it had to be dealt with. After September 11, he had said that we would have to return to the issue of WMD because the attacks had shown us the changing nature of international terrorism and because of our concerns about a potential marriage between terrorists and unstable states in possession of WMD. Subsequently, the international community had come together and had warned Saddam through Resolution 1441 that he was in violation of a variety of UN Resolutions, that the unanswered questions from UNSCOM were vast and that it was therefore important for him to give a full declaration and co-operate with a programme of weapons inspections. We had put forward into the public domain our intelligence assessment at the time. It showed clearly that Saddam was a threat. Put to him that the threat had been presented as becoming even more serious, despite the fact that it hadn’t, the PMOS said that the dynamic after September 11 had clearly changed. We had suddenly been confronted with terrorists who would stop at nothing to cause maximum carnage. Unstable states which were continuing to develop WMD posed a serious threat. In the light of that security situation, and in addition to the fact that Saddam had continued to violate his international obligations, action had been taken. The intelligence to support this could be read in the September dossier. Put to him that Mr Rumsfeld had stated specifically yesterday that there had been no new intelligence, which implied that the fresh intelligence contained in the February document had not been passed on to the US, the PMOS said that the intelligence which had been published last September had been our up-to-date intelligence assessment at that time. Asked if it had been passed on to the US, the PMOS said it went without saying that there had been discussions with the US. Put to him that Mr Rumsfeld had appeared to indicate that there was no new intelligence in the September dossier either, the PMOS said he hadn’t read it like that. The September dossier had shown the intelligence which underpinned our concerns about the nature of the threat and we stood by it.
Asked if he would agree with Mr Rumsfeld’s view that the justification for war was based on Iraq’s pre-September 11 behaviour, in contrast to the British Government’s position which had put a greater emphasis on the immediate WMD threat, and that even if the ISG did not find any WMD the conflict was still legal because of Iraq’s past form, the PMOS said that both the US and the UK, as well as most of the international community, acknowledged that, post-September 11, we were facing a different security threat. We had always said that the legal basis for war rested on WMD and UN Resolutions. Put to him that the UK and US seemed to have adopted different positions, the PMOS said that it made no difference. He pointed out that the US had always had a different view on regime change, which had been adopted during the presidency of Bill Clinton.
Questioned as to whether the decision to go to war rested on Iraq’s WMD or a failure to co-operate on UN Resolutions, the PMOS said that it rested on a failure to co-operate on UN Resolutions in respect of WMD. He advised journalists to swot up on Lord Goldsmith’s advice from March. He didn’t have it with him.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister’s comments to the Liaison Committee about the 45-minute claim should be interpreted as him believing that it had been true in September but was no longer applicable in the run-up to war due to Saddam’s concealment programme, the PMOS said that as a result of the weapons inspectors’ return to Iraq and the military build-up, we had known that Saddam had been engaged in a systematic programme of concealment. Obviously that had had an impact on the situation and had changed the nature of Saddam’s attitude in respect of his WMD capability. The intelligence had been correct at the time of issue. Asked to state categorically that the BBC’s allegation this morning - that we would not find WMD - was untrue, the PMOS said that he had already answered the question several times. We remained confident that we would find the concrete evidence of WMD programmes. If journalists wanted to dance around this particular pinhead, that was fine with him. He understood the media’s desire to focus on these issues. But, quite frankly, he did not think it sensible to pre-judge the work of the ISG. Asked if he thought that WMD which could be deployable within 45-minutes would be found, the PMOS said that it was not for him to answer the question. It was a matter for the ISG. Put to him that he appeared to be suggesting we were expecting a ’sleeping programme’ of WMD to be discovered, the PMOS said he would disagree. He repeated that we had known Saddam had had WMD. We had also known that he had continued to seek to acquire them. The reason why we had taken action against him was because he had not faced up to his UN obligations. The Prime Minister remained absolutely confident that evidence not only of Saddam’s WMD programmes would be found, but concrete evidence of the products of those programmes would be found as well. He did not know how many times he would have to repeat the same words. He thought they had been pretty clear the first time.
BBC
Asked why the Government had ‘outed’ the person who had come forward, the PMOS underlined that we had not given his name to any news organisations, except, of course, in confidence to the BBC. Given the person was one of a small group of technical experts, journalists had been able to narrow down the possibilities. As he understood it, the MoD had confirmed the person’s identity when they had been approached with the right name. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that if the BBC’s line on this was that they had nothing else to say, that was obviously a matter for them. However, we would have to assume that the person was their source in the absence of a denial. Otherwise they would probably have led the news with the fact that he wasn’t. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that it was important to go back to first principles. The Government had been accused by a BBC report on 29 May of inserting intelligence into the September dossier, against the wishes of the intelligence services and probably knowing it to be wrong so as to mislead Parliament. We had denied that story within an hour of it being broadcast. Subsequent to that, it had been denied by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the intelligence services, amongst many others. The BBC had been unwilling throughout to confirm whether they believed the allegations were true or not. They had always acknowledged that it had been based on a single source, as Andrew Gilligan himself had confirmed to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. But they had based their defence for this story on the fact that they were accurately reporting what a senior intelligence source had told them. Assuming the person who had come forward was their source - which we had to -even he was now denying their story. Questioned further, the PMOS said that the single source was the important point around which this false story had been constructed. Not only did the person deny what it was that had been reported, we also now knew from his status that he was not in a position to make the judgements Mr Gilligan reported he had made. He was not a senior intelligence source, but a technical expert. The story had been defended by the BBC’s Director of News, Richard Sambrook, and the Board of Governors on the grounds that it was based on a senior intelligence source. The question was whether they were happy to stand by that view - and the original story - knowing what they knew now. That was something only the BBC could answer.
Asked if the Government was accusing the BBC of deliberately lying, the PMOS said that he was not accusing the BBC of anything apart from broadcasting a story which we knew to be false - which even the BBC themselves were refusing to say was accurate. The only people who knew whether the BBC’s source was the same person as the one named last night were people inside the BBC. For whatever reason, they had chosen not to say that this person was not their source. Evidently it was not a question of source protection, because the individual’s identity was known. Put to him that the source had been identified by newspapers through a process of elimination, the PMOS pointed out that the person had come forward voluntarily. He queried how likely it was for a succession of Government officials to come forward and say that they had met Andrew Gilligan in a London hotel on May 22. The BBC had said that Mr Gilligan had met his source on May 22 in a central London hotel - the same day that the person who had come forward had met Mr Gilligan.
Asked if it was possible that the source had lied to the Government about what he had said to Mr Gilligan, the PMOS said that the question that mattered was whether this person was in a position to have made the judgements he was reported to have made in the light of the fact we knew he was not a senior intelligence source. Asked if our main bone of contention was really the seniority or otherwise of the person, the PMOS said that it was the issue which went to the very heart of this matter. He pointed out that the BBC Board of Governors themselves, defending producer guidelines on single sources, had talked about stories coming from senior intelligence sources being a case in point. The individual concerned had stated, for example, that he had made no comment on the role of Alastair Campbell with regard to the 45-minute issue and had explained that he was not involved in the process of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier. Now that this person’s identity had been revealed, people could make up their own minds about him. Our main bone of contention was that the allegations were completely false.
Asked if the Government was intending to take further action against the BBC, the PMOS said that the BBC was a public service broadcaster. It was up to them to make their own decisions. Everyone in public service had to do what they thought was right. It wasn’t up to us to tell the BBC what to do - that was a decision for them. There were, however, legitimate questions in terms of whether they stood by their view that their source was a senior intelligence source and how that affected the story if they were not prepared to do that. Asked to what lengths the Government would go to get these questions answered, the PMOS said that, unlike the BBC, he had to answer questions from the media. If the BBC decided not to comment, that was a decision for them to take. Asked if that meant that the Government would let the issue drop, the PMOS said that this issue was of fundamental importance because it was about trust and integrity. That was precisely why we continued to take issue with it. Pressed further, the PMOS said that this was an issue about which we still had serious concerns. He did not think that anything which had come out over the last forty-eight hours gave any reason for those concerns to be lessened in any way - quite the opposite.
Asked if the alleged source was a signatory of the Officials Secrets Act, the PMOS said he didn’t know. He had been told by the MOD that, on the information he had given so far, they believed that he was not in breach of it in any event.
Parliamentary Ombudsman
Asked to explain why it was prejudicial to the safety of the State to allow the Parliamentary Ombudsmen to check whether Ministers had declared all their interests, the PMOS said that the Cabinet Office was issuing a response to this point today. As he understood it, the issue regarding disclosure of personal information would potentially mean that details relating to Ministers’ bank accounts would be made public, for example. Obviously that was not something to which the Government could agree. He pointed out that procedures were already in place in respect of conflicts of interest. Asked whether the Prime Minister declared all his gifts, the PMOS reminded journalists that on 14 March we had provided them with a long list of all ministerial gifts worth over £140, which was an unprecedented disclosure.
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