Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: ISC Report and Anglo-French Meeting.
ISC Report
Asked if the Prime Minister accepted that ordinary members of the public might have been misled over the way intelligence had been presented in the case for military action, the PMOS said he thought that it was only right to wait for the Hutton Inquiry to conclude on these issues before commenting. There were a lot of things he could say about the ISC report, but he had to be alive to the read-across to Hutton. He referred journalists to what the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary had said today.
Put to him that Hutton was not looking into the issue of a supposed link between Iraq and Al Qaida, the evidence of which, as the Prime Minister had told the House on 18 March 2003, was ‘loose’ but ‘hardening’ and which presented "in my judgement a real and present danger to Britain and international security" - but which contradicted what the ISC had said the JIC had told the Prime Minister in February 2003, namely that there was a real danger that "any collapse of the Iraqi regime would increase the risk of chemical and biological warfare technology or agents finding their way into the hands of terrorists" [ISC Report, para 127] and that the threat "would be heightened by military action against Iraq" [Ibid., para 126], the PMOS said that the JIC assessment had flagged up the risk of a transfer of material in the event of regime collapse. It was for the Prime Minister to make judgements about security threats and as paragraph 128 of the report showed, he had explained his thinking behind his decision. The PMOS said that from the way the question had been put, he presumed that journalists accepted that WMD existed and that there was a risk of leaving unchecked a rogue state which was developing WMD in defiance of its UN obligations and that had a record of supporting terrorist organisations. The Prime Minister had had to make a judgement in respect of the overall risk assessment. Paragraph 4 of the ISC report stated that, "Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, we said that ‘the scale of the threat and vulnerability of Western states to terrorists with this degree of sophistication and a total disregard for their own lives was not understood’, and the focus on preventing terrorist groups such as Al Qaida from acquiring WMD dramatically increased. Unfortunately, most of the countries that supported terrorist groups, but not necessarily Al Qaida, were also the countries developing and proliferating WMD. This meant that firmer action needed to be taken to prevent proliferation and the passing of WMD to terrorist groups". As the Prime Minister had said in paragraph 128, that was his judgement. Time would tell.
Put to him that the Prime Minister had not told MPs of the JIC’s assessment that the terrorist threat would be heightened by military action against Iraq, the PMOS pointed out that there would always be that risk in the aftermath of the collapse of any regime. The Prime Minister had judged - and continued to believe - that the risk as a result of inaction would have been greater. Asked if the Prime Minister had informed Cabinet of the JIC’s assessment, the PMOS said that he couldn’t recall a Cabinet discussion on the point. Put to him that he should have done given it had been an important piece of information, the PMOS said that the JIC had simply flagged up the risk of a transfer of material in the event of a regime collapse. It was up to the Prime Minister to make a policy judgement from that, which he had done. Asked to explain how Cabinet would have been able to make a policy judgement without this vital piece of information, the PMOS pointed out that the Cabinet had had private briefings with the Chairman of the JIC.
Put to him that the JIC’s assessment had gone further than simply flagging up the threat of a transfer of material in the event of a regime collapse and had indicated that the war on terror would actually be exacerbated by military action against Iraq, the PMOS pointed out that other JIC material contained information relating to the threat from Iraq under Saddam. The Prime Minister had made a judgement, as it was his job to do. As the ISC itself had stated, post-September 11, the risk of a coming together of rogue states and terrorist groups - if the rogue states were allowed to go unchecked in terms of the development of their chemical and biological programmes - obviously would have increased, which was one of the reasons why action had to be taken. Moreover, Saddam had been defiance of countless UN Resolutions since 1991. The international community had to make a judgement as to whether its word meant anything if, having set down those UN Resolutions, they continued to be defied.
Asked if Downing Street was confident that the House of Commons would have voted for war had they known about this specific piece of intelligence from the JIC, the PMOS said that the Commons had voted in the way it had voted. The arguments had been put and people had reached their own judgements.
Anglo-French Meeting
Questioned about the Anglo-French meeting today which had been attended by the Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor, Andrew Smith, Jacqui Smith and their French counterparts, the PMOS said that both Prime Ministers had expressed their sadness over the news from Sweden this morning about the death of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh. There had also been a minute’s silence in memory of the victims of the September 11 attacks. Asked what had been on the agenda for the talks, the PMOS said they had discussed pensions, where both we and France were looking for sustainable and fair solutions to the demographic challenges facing all European societies. There had also been a discussion on employment, where we were both looking to increase the number of people in work and bring more women and older people into the workforce. We were both also looking at ways to create a business-friendly environment and focus resources effectively to provide a high quality healthcare system as well as funding for vital research. There had also been a discussion about removing the burdens placed on citizens or businesses as a result of through ill-thought out legislation or inefficient public services. Asked if the French had requested the meeting because they believed that the way they had been doing things was wrong and that we were doing things right, the PMOS said he wasn’t sure that was exactly how Prime Minister Raffarin would characterise it. The meeting had provided a forum in which two close allies could exchange ideas.
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