Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Anna Lindh, Northern Ireland, ISC Report/Iraq, ID Cards and Carole Caplin.
Anna Lindh
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister had spoken to Prime Minister Persson of Sweden this morning to express condolences on behalf of the Government and the British people following the tragic death of the Swedish Foreign Minister yesterday.
Northern Ireland
The PMOS informed journalists that the Prime Minister would be having an informal meeting with the Taoiseach tomorrow at Chequers. The meeting was part of the post-summer discussions obviously relating to the question of how we could move forward on Northern Ireland.
ISC Report/Iraq
Asked to point to anything the Prime Minister had said at the time of the publication of the September dossier which reflected the fact that he had been advised by the JIC about the threat from Al Qaida and WMD, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had been elected to lead and to make judgements. Part of his thinking in relation to Iraq and terrorism had been spelled out in paragraph 128 of the ISC report. Tackling issues of terrorism and WMD was clearly not a precise science. It couldn’t be. As a result, the Prime Minister’s judgements would obviously be subjective. We were not talking about risk-free options here. Terrorism and the development of WMD were not alternatives. It was not a question of either/or. Both were a threat. He pointed out that the JIC had not been looking at the merits or otherwise of military action against Iraq. Nor had it been examining the broader question of whether the risks of action outweighed the risks of inaction or vice versa. It was their role to produce assessments. It was politicians’ role to make decisions. Since the dossier had been published last September, there had been many intelligence assessments relating both to terrorism and Iraq. The decisions taken by the Prime Minister had been informed by the judgements he himself had made on the basis of the available information and other relevant factors. His beliefs were firmly held and he continued to stand by them. There were also other important reasons why we had taken action against Iraq which had been spelled out very clearly. For example, Saddam’s defiance of the UN and the potential damage to the credibility of international institutions if that counted for nothing. The message that would send to other tyrannical regimes who might be developing WMD. And also, as the Prime Minister had said, the development over time of a nexus between terrorism and WMD.
Asked for further explanation, the PMOS said that as we had been pointing out consistently for some time, there was a difference between what we had said and what the US had said in relation to Al Qaida and Iraqi links. We had never over-claimed anything. That said, the Prime Minister had been consistent in respect of the potential linkage between WMD and terrorism. Of course there were risks of taking action. Equally, there were risks of inaction. That was no reason to allow somebody to continue to flout their UN obligations to develop WMD which clearly posed a threat and which could, in the future, end up in the hands of terrorist organisations. These were sincerely held beliefs by the Prime Minister and had been expressed with conviction. His views had not changed.
Put to him that MPs who had voted in favour of taking military action against Iraq had done so without knowing about the JIC’s assessment and that nor had Cabinet Ministers seen it, the PMOS said that as he understood it, JIC assessments were routinely circulated to senior members of the Cabinet. For example, the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and the Chancellor would have seen them as a matter of course. Questioned about the individual briefings from the JIC, the PMOS said that he didn’t know what issues would have been raised. Pressed as to why the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet had not shared the intelligence information with the rest of Parliament, the PMOS said that the Government had shared a considerable amount of intelligence relating to Iraq in terms of explaining why we believed it had been a serious threat. That was the September dossier. Everyone would accept that the publication of the information was unprecedented. But we had done it as a result of an exceptional level of public interest in the matter. Subsequent to the dossier, there had been a number of other JIC assessments both on Iraq and on terrorism. However, there was no standing commitment to make all intelligence assessments available to Parliament. Put to him that it appeared the Government had been ‘cherry-picking’ the intelligence that had been provided, the PMOS repeated that the Prime Minister had been elected to make judgements. He had given Parliament an opportunity to vote on the issue. The ISC themselves had said in their report that, following September 2001 ‘this meant that firmer action needed to be taken to prevent proliferation or the passing of WMD to terrorist groups". Everyone was aware of the background to the conflict. It went without saying that the Government would have preferred Saddam to have been disarmed peacefully. That choice had been open to him. In the end, however, he had chosen not to take it.
Put to him that the failure to tell MPs and some members of the Cabinet about the JIC assessment effectively meant that the Prime Minister had ‘rigged’ the vote in the Commons, the PMOS repeated that, following the publication of the September dossier, there would have been a large number of other JIC assessments in relation to Iraq and terrorism. Challenged that the JIC had stated that Iraq was not the great threat that it had been made out to be and that this was an important piece of information which should not have been withheld, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had put before the House his judgement as to why he believed that action against Iraq was necessary. These were clearly difficult judgements to make - and no one was pretending otherwise. It went without saying that they were not taken lightly. They were made on the basis of all the available information. There had been a whole range of different factors which had helped the Prime Minister to make his decision. Terrorism and WMD were not an either/or question. Both were threats and both had to be dealt with.
Questioned about the other pieces of intelligence from the JIC to which he continually referred, the PMOS said he was simply making the point that the Prime Minister was shown intelligence material the whole time. That was the way the JIC worked. Asked if there had been another report, following the JIC’s report in February, which had caused the Prime Minister to start talking about the hardening up of evidence which showed a link between Iraq and Al Qaida, the PMOS said that we had always been very cautious not to over-claim anything with regard to links between Iraq and Al Qaida. On many occasions we had been invited to make strong connections. The Prime Minister had spoken about the issue during his Liaison Committee session in February for example and had chosen his words carefully. What he had said in the House had been based on his knowledge at the time, which, in turn, would have been informed by intelligence he had received.
Asked why there had been a rush to war in spite of the fact the JIC had stated that Iraq was many weeks and months away from producing a large quantity of nerve agent and given the fact that the presence of the UN inspectors was also said to have stopped production of chemical and biological weapons, the PMOS said that people appeared to be assuming that WMD was an issue which the Government had chanced upon last September and, together with the US Government, had used as a pretext for a conflict which had been pre-ordained. That was simply not the case. WMD had been a live issue for over twelve years. Saddam had actually used these weapons on his own people and had been in defiance of countless UN Resolutions which had set down an obligation for him to disarm. He had chosen to ignore them.
Questioned as to whether the continuing attacks on Coalition troops in Iraq had proven right the JIC’s warning that military action would serve to increase the terrorist threat, the PMOS said that no one had been under any illusion that there would be difficulties after the conflict. They were being dealt with. Nor was anyone under-estimating the challenges facing us in Iraq. People had genuinely held views on both sides of the argument. We respected the views put forward by those who had been against the conflict. Equally, the Prime Minister had set out many times why he believed - and continued to believe - it had been the right thing to do. The PMOS said that he had just gone through some of them again. As the Prime Minister had stated in the ISC report, time would tell.
Asked if the JIC assessment had given a recommendation as to whether the Government should go to war or not, the PMOS repeated that it was not the role of the JIC or the intelligence services to make recommendations. Their purpose was to put intelligence assessments before politicians whose job it was to make judgements. Asked if he was seriously suggesting that the head of MI6 would not have offered the Prime Minister his opinion about the risks of going to war, the PMOS said that he wasn’t privy to every single conversation which the Prime Minister had. He was merely explaining the role of intelligence informing decision-making processes. In the end, judgements were made by elected politicians.
Asked if the Prime Minister regreted producing the September dossier, the PMOS said no. He believed it had been important to put before the country the intelligence assessments which had under-pinned the view as to why Saddam Hussein was a threat.
Asked if the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) would be issuing a progress report on its work, the PMOS said that the ISG was due to publish a report at some point in the future. For obvious reasons, the timing was a matter for them.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister had been recalled to give evidence to the second stage of the Hutton Inquiry, the PMOS said that the Government had underlined consistently that it would co-operate fully with the Inquiry. That remained the case. Any announcements as to whom Lord Hutton might recall and when he would wish to see them was a matter for him and his Inquiry team.
ID Cards
Asked if the issue of ID cards was expected to feature in the Queen’s Speech, the PMOS said that we never previewed the Queen’s Speech. However, this was obviously an issue which the Government was looking into very carefully. The fact that there had been a detailed discussion about it at Cabinet yesterday and that the DA Cabinet Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, would be spending more time examining the issue was an indication of the thoroughness with which the Government was approaching the matter. It went without saying that we wanted to get it absolutely right. Asked the Prime Minister’s opinion of ID cards in the light of reports that the Deputy Prime Minister was against the idea, the PMOS said the Prime Minister believed that the DA Committee was the right place to examine the issue and that they should be allowed to get on with their work. The PMOS pointed to David Blunkett’s comments yesterday regarding reported Cabinet positions in the media on this issue.
Carole Caplin
Asked to confirm reports that Carole Caplin had had her Downing Street security pass taken away, the PMOS said that he had nothing to add to what we had been saying about this matter last night, namely that we never discussed issues relating to security in Downing Street.
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